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Philip Alexander Rajko 
1 Introduction 
Behavioural economics is a paradigm bringing together established economic methodology 
such as game theory and additional insights about human agency taken from psychology. Es-
sentially, it accounts for a higher psychological realism, explicitly considering the psycho-
logical effects involved in economic decision making. Thus behavioural economics extends 
the standard assumptions of economics and increases the predictive power of economic mod-
els (Rabin, 2002). The basic idea for this interaction of disciplines dates back to H. A. Simon 
(1955).1 By now, behavioural economics is an established field of economics in its own right 
with steadily growing importance for economics research (Rabin, 2002; Smith, 1991).2 Re-
garding its methodological foundation, behavioural economics makes extensive use of ex-
perimental economics (Loewenstein, 1999).3 Furthermore, it is also concerned with new eco-
nomic theories accounting for behavioural effects and the analysis of empirical data.4  
This thesis dwells upon topics in behavioural economics: information and fairness. It presents 
five studies, the first four focusing on the usage of information, the fifth being directed at 
fairness. The studies on information cover a broad range of topics in the economics literature. 
The first two are concerned with auction theory, i.e. the second-price sealed-bid and the Eng-
lish auction. The contributions in this thesis extend these formats with information acquisition 
behaviour. This behaviour has gained recent attention with some theoretical works, but has 
not been tested experimentally, yet. The first of the two studies focuses on instrumental in-
formation, i.e. the private value of an object at auction which is unknown to the bidder ex-
ante. The value of this information can be assessed according to a rational choice model 
(Compte and Jehiel, 2007). The experimental results falsify the rational usage of information 
acquisition strategies and motivate the second study, where the demand for non-instrumental 
information, i.e. information which cannot be used for a rational bidding strategy, is analysed 
in a similar auction context. The third contribution addresses the game-theoretic framework of 
                                                          
1
 An anthology of behavioural economics is provided by Camerer and Loewenstein (2004). 
2
  Some useful overviews on the field of behavioural economics can be found in Earl (1990), Smith (1991), 
Rabin (1998) and recently DellaVigna (2009). Etzioni (2011) provides an outlook on future directions for the 
evolution of the behavioural economics paradigm. 
3
  Also field experiments become increasingly popular as a research approach in behavioural economics (e.g. 
Harrison and List (2004), Levitt and List (2009)).  
4
  Camerer, Loewenstein and Rabin (2004) give a comprehensive overview on the current state of the art regard-
ing research in behavioural economics. 
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global games (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993; Morris and Shin, 1998, 2003). In this frame-
work, current theory makes opposing predictions for two kinds of uncertainty, i.e. risk and 
ambiguity (Ui, 2009). These theoretical predictions are put on test with an experimental 
analysis of risk and ambiguity in global games framed as a speculative attack game. The fol-
lowing study deals with disclosing conflicts of interest. Here the experimental design is based 
on an established theory for a game with strategic information transmission (Crawford and 
Sobel, 1982), where one player has a monetary incentive to deceive the other player. When 
this conflict of interest is made transparent, the extent of deceptive behaviour increases sig-
nificantly. Finally, the last contribution immerses in the realm of economic fairness and the 
assumption of economic agents having social preferences (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999). In this regard, the standard approach of one-dimensional fairness is ex-
tended and two-dimensional fairness in a real effort game is studied. As a result, the exploita-
tion of a self-serving bias effect, i.e. players distorting fairness norms to their own advantage 
whenever possible, is substantiated with experimental data. The remainder of this section 
gives a chapter by chapter overview on the main results, obtained within this thesis. 
For chapter 2, which is joint work with Vitali Gretschko, one can state that information acqui-
sition is crucial to almost all real world auctions, where one’s valuation usually is fully un-
known or at least very imprecise. This is already addressed by some of the recent theoretical 
work. We extend the literature, providing the first experimental test of auctions with explicit 
information acquisition in terms of acquisition strategies, timing and bidding behaviour. In 
doing so, we focus on the second-price sealed-bid and the English auction. Firstly, the main 
finding is excess information acquisition in both auction formats. For costs of information 
well above its rational value, a majority of subjects still chooses to acquire information. This 
effect is robust to learning and does not fade in the course of the experiment. Secondly, even 
if subjects make the optimal decision whether to purchase information; they prematurely buy 
in the English auction. In theory the English auction offers more information, as players can 
observe the drop out decisions of their competitors. However, in our experiment the subjects 
fail to use this advantage of the dynamic format. As a final result both informed and unin-
formed bidders significantly underbid in our experiment. Further it is shown how risk aver-
sion also fails explaining the observed behaviour. However, assuming that bidders anticipate 
regret that they observe ex-post due to paying too much in an auction, we can extend the ini-
tial model and accommodate the experimental results.  
- 3 - 
In chapter 3 information acquisition behaviour in auctions is addressed from a different per-
spective. Already having established the effect of excess information acquisition, this work 
investigates if and how subjects acquire non-instrumental information. Therefore, a second-
price sealed-bid auction is conducted, where all strategically relevant information is free but 
additional non-instrumental information is sold in the course of the auction. In this experi-
ment, the two main effects found in the data are a significant acquisition of non-instrumental 
information and an underbidding effect, when scrutinising the bidding strategies. The acquisi-
tion of non-instrumental information goes along with the results from the previous study and 
supports some preference for confidence. Moreover, only after buying the non-instrumental 
information the bidding strategies exhibit a strong underbidding effect. This is a finding rarely 
observed in second-price auctions.  
Chapter 4 is joint work with Christopher Zeppenfeld. In this contribution global games are 
studied experimentally. These games of incomplete information are very important, when it 
comes to applications such as market choices, refinancing company debts or speculative at-
tacks. We use a model of global games based on maximising minimum expected utility, 
which predicts opposite effects for the behaviour in equilibrium under risk and ambiguity. 
This prediction is tested with an experiment based on the speculative attack game. We find 
that under both types of fundamental uncertainty subjects almost always play undominated 
switching strategies, i.e. they do not choose one strategy when they know that the other strat-
egy yields a higher pay-off with certainty. However, only few adhere to unique cut-off values, 
where they would always switch their strategies from the safe to the risky action. Further-
more, when estimating cut-off values we find excess aggressiveness for subjects’ behaviour, 
i.e. the risky action is chosen for much lower signals than the theoretical optimum predicts. 
This can be rationalised as a best response to the belief in others being overly optimistic and 
aggressive. Finally, our main finding regards the opposite theoretical predictions for risk and 
ambiguity. Accordingly, risk about the distribution of signals should improve the coordination 
in equilibrium, whereas ambiguity should reduce is. This must be falsified based on the ex-
perimental data, where we find no significant difference in estimated individual cut-off values 
or aggregate coordination between risk and ambiguity. 
Chapter 5 is joint work with Axel Ockenfels and Roman Inderst. It presents an experimental 
study on disclosing conflicts of interest. Conflicts of interest occur in situations of advice giv-
ing between a client and a better informed advisor, as it is often found in the financial services 
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industry. Economic theory captures this matter by means of principal-agent models or games 
of information transmission. We experimentally investigate how different degrees of transpar-
ency about a conflict of interest influence individual decision making in a game of strategic 
information transmission. It turns out that increasing transparency about the conflict of inter-
est has a significant effect on both the deceptive behaviour of advisors and the strategic re-
sponse behaviour of advisees. The advisors do deceive, but not to an extent which would be 
predicted by standard theory. Hence we find an overcommunication effect, where the mes-
sages sent between the two players still contain valuable information. Similarly, when know-
ing about a prevailing conflict of interest, advisees do not sufficiently discount the biased in-
formation they receive.  
Economic fairness is scrutinised both theoretically and experimentally in chapter 6, in a joint 
work with Georg Gebhardt. The impact of fairness on economic decision making in terms of 
monetary distributions is already well established. However, in many real life encounters the 
issue of multi-dimensional fairness may play a crucial role, i.e. payment, effort and ability 
might all shape our perception of fairness to some extent. To formalise this notion, we extend 
a standard model of social preferences with working effort as a second non-monetary dimen-
sion. We then devise an experimental design to investigate the effect of two-dimensional fair-
ness in a meaningful real effort game. With asymmetric endowments unfairness is induced in 
the initial distribution and allows us to study redistribution behaviour based on working times. 
The redistribution follows standard protocols of a dictator and an ultimatum game, respec-
tively. The experimental data proves that our approach of two-dimensional fairness is feasible 
and subjects employ both dimensions to establish overall fairness. Hence, when providing 
more effort, the subsequent offers in monetary terms are steadily declining. With our theoreti-
cal model extension we can estimate the conversion factors for time and money for all sub-
jects, assuming standard fairness parameters. Subsequently, the experimental data proves that 
in the dictator treatment subjects exhibit a self-serving bias distorting the usual fairness norms 
by taking a higher conversion factor, for their personal advantage.  
The final chapter 7 summarises the main insights and pinpoints directions for further research.  
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2 Excess Information Acquisition in Auctions 
2.1 Introduction  
Auctions are one of the most important mechanisms for the efficient allocation of goods.5 
Procurement auctions, spectrum auctions, eBay auctions, google AdWords and many more 
are examples for market places, where goods worth billions of dollars are sold via auctions 
(Lucking-Reiley, 2000a; Varian, 2009). Their importance is also stylised by extensive schol-
arly work during the last decades. The theoretical literature has analysed various auction 
mechanisms in great detail and identified some principles such as the revenue equivalence 
theorem (Milgrom and Weber, 1982; Myerson, 1981). The experimental literature has brought 
to light some robust behavioural patterns such as overbidding in first price auctions with pri-
vate values or the winner’s curse in common value auctions (Charness and Levin, 2009; 
Harrison, 1989; Kagel and Levin, 1986). Nevertheless, the impact of information acquisition 
in standard auction formats has found little attention so far (Compte and Jehiel, 2007).  
However, information acquisition is a matter with high relevance to auctions. For example, in 
spectrum auctions, additional information is usually acquired by means of technical research 
about the infrastructure, internal reports on future revenues or experts’ opinions on the valua-
tions of competitors. The same logic also applies to corporate takeovers, where ex ante the 
information about corporate valuations is unknown or at least unreliable. The typical large 
datasets from auction platforms cannot help explaining the effects of information acquisition, 
as these costs usually materialise outside the auction itself and hence cannot be observed on 
such platforms, even ex post. Therefore, we use a laboratory experiment directly attune to a 
rational choice model of auctions with information acquisition to study its effects on informa-
tion acquisition behaviour and it dynamics. Our experiment implements two standard auction 
mechanisms, i.e. a second-price sealed-bid and an English auction with independent private 
values. Both formats are augmented with the opportunity of buying information about one’s 
valuation at any time during the auction. Prior to their information acquisition subjects only 
know the distribution of their valuations, but not their precise value. Based on our experimen-
                                                          
5
 This chapter is joint work with Vitali Gretschko. 
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tal results we provide three new and robust insights into the behaviour in such auctions. 
Firstly, subjects follow excess information acquisition strategies compared to the predictions 
of the rational choice model. Secondly, in the dynamic format of the English auction subjects 
also fail to employ an optimal timing for their information acquisition and thus buy prema-
turely. Finally, in terms of the bidding strategies we find an underbidding effect, which is in-
dependent of the previous information acquisition decision. Furthermore, we proceed by ex-
tending the initial model with both risk aversion and anticipated regret. This yields that only 
anticipated regret can explain both excess information acquisition and underbidding.  
The remainder of this paper unfolds in five sections. In section 2 the theoretical foundations 
are laid and the equilibrium properties for auctions with information acquisition are character-
ised. Next the experimental design and procedures are presented. Then section 4 discusses our 
experimental results. Section 5 shows that risk aversion and loss aversion cannot accommo-
date our results, but regret avoidance can. Finally the main insights are summarised and an 
outlook on subsequent research on auctions with information acquisition is provided. 
2.2 Model and Equilibrium Properties 
2.2.1 Related Literature 
In the literature auctions with information acquisition are a relatively new branch. Hence, 
there are only few papers explicitly concerned with information acquisition in the context of 
auctions and to the best of our knowledge, there are no experimental or empirical studies. The 
theoretical work largely focuses on the comparison of different auction formats in terms of 
information acquisition strategies, revenues and efficiency. The second-price sealed-bid auc-
tion and the English auction are the most prominent formats when it comes to studying infor-
mation acquisition in independent private value environments. 
Matthews (1984) is the first to address the bidding and information acquisition strategies in a 
pure common value first-price sealed-bid auction. Thereby he focuses on the effects on effi-
ciency and seller revenue. Hausch and Li (1993) extend this work by comparing first-price 
and second-price auction. They find that bidders shade their bids by the amount invested in 
information and thereby diminish seller’s revenue. Nevertheless, the second-price auction 
dominates the first-price auction in terms of revenue. Bergemann et al. (2009) are interested 
in the impact of endogenous information acquisition on efficiency in an interdependent value 
- 7 - 
setting. They employ a mechanism design approach and show that increasing the degree of 
correlation between the valuations is diminishing the efficiency. For the case of affiliated 
valuations, Persico (2000) has shown that there should be more information acquisition in the 
first-price than in the second-price auction. Finally, if there is a private and a common value 
component, Hernando-Vecina (2009) argues not only revenue but also efficiency under in-
formation acquisition is higher in the English auction than in the second-price auction. One of 
the first works on information acquisition in independent private value auctions was con-
ducted by Lee (1985), who shows that in a first-price auction the endogenous entry decisions 
are deterred by an increasing amount of information acquisition. Guzman and Kolstad (1997) 
find an equilibrium of a first-price auction when the cost of information acquisition is private 
information. Shi (2007) characterises the optimal auction based on the assumption that infor-
mation can be acquired prior to the auction start. He shows that the optimal symmetric 
mechanism is a standard auction with a reservation price that depends on the ex ante mean 
valuation of the bidders.  
Contrary to the models above, the following body of literature allows for information acquisi-
tion not only prior to the auction but also during the auction. The simplest way of modelling 
mid-auction information acquisition is to allow for multi-stage auctions as proposed by 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1988). He shows that allowing for multiple bidding rounds with bid 
disclosure increases the amount of information acquisition and thereby the revenue in a sec-
ond-price auction. Parkes (2005) extends this idea in a general mechanism design setting and 
shows by computer-based simulations that the English auction achieves a higher allocative 
efficiency than a second-price auction. Rasmussen (2006) analyses the incentives to acquire 
information in an eBay style auction and shows that information acquisition might be a expla-
nation for sniping and incremental bidding on eBay. Rezende (2005) finds an equilibrium of 
the English and the second-price auction in a very general informational setting. He shows 
that bidders in the English auction buy more information and place higher bids than in the 
second-price auction. This leads to higher revenue in the English auction if the number of 
bidders grows large. This result is driven by the fact that bidders may condition their informa-
tion acquisition decisions on the observed price in the English auction. Contrary to that, 
Compte and Jehiel (2000, 2007) allow for the bidders to observe the remaining competitors in 
the English auction. They show in a setting where some of the bidders are perfectly informed 
and some of the bidders are perfectly uninformed that more information is acquired in the 
English auction than in the second-price auction and thereby the revenue is higher in the for-
- 8 - 
mer if the number of bidders grows large. The results obtained by Compte and Jehiel (2007) 
are very intuitive and don’t demand for sophisticated bidding strategies. Hence, their set up is 
well suited for a first experimental investigation of bidders’ behaviour in auctions with infor-
mation acquisition. 
2.2.2 The Rational Expected Value Model and Equilibrium Properties 
In the following we characterise the equilibrium behaviour in an English auction and in a sec-
ond-price sealed-bid auction with one fully uninformed bidder. Our model is a special case of 
the model in Compte and Jehiel (2000).6 More precisely,  risk neutral bidders are competing 
in an auction for an indivisible object. Each bidder  assigns a value of  to the object. The 
valuation is independently and identically distributed on 0,100	 according to the uniform 
distribution. Before the auction starts, all bidders but bidder 1 observe their private valuations. 
Bidder 1 is only informed about the distribution of the valuations. 
In the second-price auction bidder 1 decides before the auction starts whether to learn his true 
valuation at price 
  . After the information acquisition decision all bidders simultane-
ously submit a bid for the object. The bidder with the highest bid wins the auction and pays 
the second highest bid to the auctioneer. In equilibrium it is a weakly dominant strategy for 
the informed bidders to bid their valuations.7 If bidder 1 remains uninformed, his best reply to 
the bidding strategies of the other bidders is to bid 	. Hence, he will acquire information 
before the auction starts, if the expected utility of acquiring information is higher than the 
expected utility of not acquiring information:8 
(1)  max,   	  
   maxE	,   	. 
We summarise this finding in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1 
In a second price auction bidder 1 acquires information if and only if  
                                                          
6
 In the following we draw upon the results of Compte and Jehiel (2000). 
7
 Remember the auction for the informed bidders is identical to a the standard second price auction, thus for 
these bidders the standard results as in Vickrey (1961) also hold.  
8
 Let  denote the highest order statistic of n-1 independent draws from the uniform distribution between 0 
and 100. 
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max, 	  maxE	, 	   
 . 
A bidder who is informed about his valuation bids according to   . If bidder 1 chooses to 
remain uninformed he bids according to   	. 
Proof See Compte and Jehiel (2000)      ■ 
In the English auction a price clock starts at a price of 0 and continuously increases. At each 
price p bidder 1 may decide whether to learn his true valuation at a cost 
   and whether 
to stay in the auction or not. All other bidders only decide on whether to leave the auction at 
price p. Each dropping out decision is commonly observed by all bidders. The last bidder re-
maining in the auction receives the object at the price at which the last opponent dropped out. 
Again bidders who are informed about their valuation  have the weakly dominant strategy 
to drop out whenever   . Hence, it remains to determine when the only uninformed bid-
der 1 will acquire information. For this purpose two functions are defined: 
, 
  max,     |  	  
 and 
"  max	,     |  	. 
The values , 
 and " correspond to bidders 1’s expected payoff when the current 
price is  and one other bidder remains active. At this point bidder 1 should decide to acquire 
information and remain active up to his true valuation or not to acquire information and drop 
out at min, 	. Note that until only one other bidder remains, bidder 1 does not have to 
make this decision.  
For a full characterisation of the equilibrium we define for each 
: 
(2)    %%
  sup)  0,100	|, 
  "* and 
(3)   %
  inf)  0,100	|max,   	  
  0 *. 
For illustrative purposes the two relevant price levels and the resulting information acquisition 
strategies are depicted in the following figure 2.1: 
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Figure 2.1: Equilibrium Information Acquisition Decision of Bidder 
Here %%
 is the highest  such that the expected payoff from buying information at  ex-
ceeds the expected payoff from not buying information, and %
 is the lowest  such that 
the information cost is lower than the expected loss from buying at a price above valuation. 
Finally,  denotes the total number of remaining bidders when the current price is . Then 
the equilibrium behaviour is characterised as follows: 
Proposition 2 
If  Np - 2: 
Bidder 1 does not acquire information and stays in if p / 012)p%c, Ev	*. 
If Np  2 two cases are relevant: 
1) p%c - p%%c:  
Then bidder 1 never acquires information and drops out at Ev	. 
2 %
 / %%
:  
a) If     %
, %%
	, bidder 1 acquires information and drops out immediately if  -   and stays in the auction as long as  / . 
b) If  - %%
 he drops out at min)	, *. 
c) If  / %
 stays in and acquires information at %
 and drops out immediately if  -   and stays in the auction as long as  / . 
Bidders 2, … ,  drop out when the price reaches his valuation, i.e., at   . 
Proof See Compte and Jehiel (2000)      ■ 
In the English auction it is sufficient for bidder 1 to know whether his true valuation is below 
the current price to avoid buying at an unfavourable price. As long as more than one competi-
tor is still in the auction the probability of winning the object at the next price increase is 0. 
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Hence, it is a dominant strategy not to buy information and to observe how strong the compe-
tition is. As soon as only one competitor is left in the auction, bidder 1 has to trade off the cost 
of information acquisition, the probability of winning and the risk of buying at an unfavour-
able price. 
Having characterised the equilibrium behaviour in both auctions we can derive our hypothe-
ses for the experiment. The first two hypotheses are concerned with the information acquisi-
tion decision of the uninformed bidder 1. 
Hypothesis 1: If the cost of information acquisition is high, bidder 1 always refrains from in-
formation acquisition in the second-price auction. If the cost of information acquisition is low, 
bidder 1 always buys information.  
Hypothesis 2: In the English auction bidder 1 never acquires information as long as more than 
one other bidder is active in the auction. If only one other bidder is left in the auction, the tim-
ing of the information acquisition is given by Proposition 2. 
The next two hypotheses are making predictions regarding the bidding strategies of bidder 1. 
Hypothesis 3: If bidder 1 learns his true valuation, he bids truthfully in the second-price auc-
tion and drops out of the English auction as soon as the price has reached his valuation. 
Hypothesis 4: If bidder 1 remains uninformed in the second-price auction, he bids his ex-
pected valuation. If bidder 1 remains uninformed in the English auction he drops out at max )p%%c, Ev7	*. 
2.3 Experimental Design and Procedures 
For our experimental design we followed the basic structure of the already characterised theo-
retical model.9 Accordingly, in every auction group only one player did not know his valua-
tion ex ante. The other players always had perfect information about their valuations. We 
chose groups of four players and, as we are only interested in the behaviour of the one unin-
formed player per group, we opted to implement the three remaining players as bidding ro-
bots. These robots were programmed to always bid their true valuation, which was also ex-
plained to the human subjects in the instructions. The uninformed human bidder only knew 
                                                          
9
 For the full experimental instructions refer to the appendix.    
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that his valuation is uniformly distributed between 0 and 100. Moreover, it was common 
knowledge that the valuations of the three bidding robots were drawn from the same distribu-
tion.  
The main innovation of our experiment is the investigation of information acquisition in auc-
tions. Hence we offered the human participants with unknown valuation to buy their valuation 
at a certain cost. This cost parameter was varied between the treatments in order to test our 
theoretical predictions. Following the main hypotheses low cost (c = 2) and high cost (c = 8) 
were chosen. Furthermore, for studying the timing of information acquisition behaviour in a 
dynamic environment, we used two different standard auction formats; the second-price 
sealed-bid auction as a static and the English auction as a dynamic format. The object at auc-
tion was not specified, and profits for the auction were calculated as one’s valuation minus the 
final price and, if applicable, minus the cost for information acquisition. This gives the fol-
lowing 2 x 2 design for the four experimental treatment variations:  
 Information Costs 
Auction Format Low Cost High Cost 
2nd Price Auction c = 2 c = 8 
English Auction c = 2 c = 8 
Table 2.1: Experimental Treatments 
In the second-price auction, information acquisition was only possible prior to the auction, i.e. 
before submitting the individual sealed-bid offer. During the English auction information 
could continuously be acquired. Here we implemented a pause button, enabling subjects to 
pause the price clock at any time to buy information and reflect upon this information. Thus 
we can rule out any time pressure effects, shaping the decision of buying information or quit-
ting the auction.10 The price clock was implemented to increase by 1 ECU every 2 seconds 
which is similar to other experiments on English auctions (Levin et al., 1996).  
Overall, every auction format was repeated for 20 rounds and valuations for all players were 
redrawn every round. As feedback we provided the subjects with the information whether 
                                                          
10
 Our design benefited from the implementation of bidding robots, so that pausing of an auction for the whole 
   group of four players did not signal any additional information to the already fully informed and programmed 
   robots. 
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they won the auction, at what price the auction was won, what their final bid was and what the 
subject has won or lost in this round including the information costs. Hence learning one’s 
valuation remained costly. If the human bidder won the auction we additionally gave feed-
back regarding his valuation, which was then known anyway, and made it easier to validate 
the profit calculations. As it was crucial for us that subjects did assess the real costs of infor-
mation acquisition, we stressed in the instructions that all losses in experimental money must 
also be covered in real money after the experiment.  
The numerical predictions for the behaviour in our experiment are directly computed from the 
equilibrium characterisation in section 2. For the second-price auction we expect the follow-
ing rational behaviour:  
Treatment Information Acquisition 
2nd Price Auction 
(low cost) always 
2nd Price Auction 
 (high cost) never 
Table 2.2: Predictions for Information Acquisition in 2nd Price Auction 
For the English auction we also expect no information acquisition in the high cost treatment, 
but can make a more sophisticated prediction regarding the timing of information acquisition 
in the low cost treatment.  
 Information Acquisition 
Treatment p*(c) p**(c) 
English Auction 
(low cost) 19.61 66.17 
English Auction 
 (high cost) never never 
Table 2.3: Predictions for Information Acquisition in English Auction 
According to the rational model information in this treatment is only acquired if the price 
clock is between 20 and 67.  
The experimental sessions took place in April 2011 at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic 
Research (CLER). We had 30 subjects per treatment and 120 subjects overall participating. 
The average payment was 13.20€ including a guaranteed show-up fee of 2.50€. On average 
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each subject participated in the experiment for 75 minutes. For the recruitment we used the 
online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) and the experiment itself was programmed 
with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).  
2.4 Experimental Analysis and Results 
2.4.1 Excess Information Acquisition  
First of all, we analyse the frequencies with which subjects harness information acquisition. 
For the high cost treatments, where the theoretical prediction was that information is never 
bought, the data in figure 2.2 shows that nevertheless subjects buy information in 59% respec-
tively 51% of all auctions. This shows excess information acquisition compared to the theo-
retical prediction in both formats.11 
  
Figure 2.2: Frequency of Information Acquisition (High Cost) 
Keeping in mind, that the optimal threshold for not buying information at all, was at informa-
tion cost of 4.6, the subjects are obviously treating this cost differently than in our rational 
choice model. In the high cost treatment we chose deliberately high cost of c = 8 in order to 
make the decision of not buying information very clear. This strong effect of excess informa-
tion acquisition offers an indication that the subjects overestimate the benefits of additional 
                                                          
11
 T-test: p-value < 0.0001.  
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information. In section 5 of this paper, we will discuss different model extensions assessing 
this effect.  
Having established the first effect, we compare the data from the two low cost treatments. 
Here the effect of excess information acquisition is also found in the dynamic format.12 How-
ever, in the static format, we find less information acquisition than predicted.13 Again both of 
the low cost treatments show information acquisition strategies in contrast with the fully ra-
tional, risk-neutral model.  
  
Figure 2.3: Frequency of Information Acquisition (Low Cost) 
Figure 2.4 illustrates the robustness of these effects over the course of the auction rounds.  
 
Figure 2.4: Development of Information Acquisition Frequencies 
                                                          
12
 T-test: p-value < 0.0001. 
13
  T-test: p-value < 0.0001. 
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There is some adaptive behaviour during the first two rounds of the experiment and then ag-
gregate behaviour converges to the already reported means in terms of information acquisi-
tion. The effect is likewise robust, when analysing the data for each individual subject, where 
we cannot find a significant amount of learning.14 
2.4.2 Premature Information Acquisition  
For the dynamic format, i.e. the English auction in our experiment, the theory does not only 
make predictions about the optimal frequencies of information acquisition, but also about the 
optimal timing of information acquisition. Therefore we first analyse the average price clock 
at time of information acquisition and compare it with the optimal value p*: 
Treatment Average Price Clock at IA Prediction p* 
English (c=2)  2 ECU 19.6 ECU 
Table 2.4: Price Clock at Information Acquisition (English Auction) 
We find premature information acquisition. In the low cost treatment, given our realisation of 
the random variable, where subjects should optimally buy at a price of at least 19.6 ECU, sub-
jects on average buy almost immediately after the start of the auction at a price of 2 ECU. 
That means after observing the competitors’ behaviour for at most 4 seconds and knowing 
that the auction could be paused at any time. Further, as long as there are at least two competi-
tors remaining, the probability of the auction terminating at the next price step is virtually 
zero. Hence the pivotal information acquisition decision in the dynamic format should factor 
in the additional information of the number of competitors. This information allows the sub-
jects to learn about the valuations of the competition at no cost and no risk. Table 2.5 corrobo-
rates the initial finding of premature information acquisition, as subjects fail to wait for the 
previous bidders to drop out before they decide on whether information should be bought. In 
the low cost treatment, where information should be bought in 75% of the auctions, when 
only one bidder is remaining, only 2.6% of information acquisitions can be classified as opti-
mal in that sense. 
                                                          
14
  See the appendix for details. 
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Treatment 
Percentage of IA 
with 1 opponent 
remaining 
Prediction 
Percentage of IA  
with ≥ 2 opponents 
remaining 
Prediction 
English (c=2)  2.6 % 75 % 97.4 % 0 % 
English (c=8)  20.2 % 0 % 79.8 % 0 % 
Table 2.5: Number of Opponents at Information Acquisition (English Auction) 
Interestingly, in the high cost treatments, where according to the rational model information 
acquisition should never occur, subjects who nevertheless engage in information acquisition 
do so after observing the competition longer and hence factoring in previous drop outs.15 
2.4.3 Underbidding Behaviour  
Next, we consider the bidding strategies employed by the subjects. First of all, the bidding 
strategies where the bidder chose to buy the information and thus had been perfectly in-
formed. Here we can calculate the deviations between the bids and valuations, for all auction 
rounds where a subject has bought information.16  
Treatment underbidding valuation bidding overbidding 
2nd Price (c=2) 35.9% 41.4% 22.7% 
2nd Price (c=8) 40.9% 33.5% 25.6% 
English (c=2)  51.6% 41.6% 6.8% 
English (c=8)  54.5% 25.6% 19.9% 
Table 2.6: Bidding Strategies with Information Across Treatments 
Valuation bidding is defined as exactly bidding one’s valuation, if informed. Respectively, 
underbidding is every bid under the valuation and overbidding every bid above the valuation. 
                                                          
15
  This finding is consistent with the price clock data from the high cost treatment, where the average price 
clock at information acquisition is at 12 ECU. 
16
  For the English auction format we could only analyse auctions, where information had been bought and the 
previously uninformed bidder did not win the auction. In this format all auctions ended once the second last 
bidder dropped out, so that we could not observe the full bidding strategy of a winner. Nevertheless, under 
the conditions of information was bought and the player did not win, 57% (c=2) respectively 35% (c=8) of 
the English auctions still qualify for this analysis.  
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Table 2.6 shows that we do not find overbidding, but in fact underbidding in our subjects’ 
behaviour. A result that is different from many the standard results received in second-price 
auctions (Cooper and Fang, 2008; Kagel and Levin, 1993). 
Additionally, we consider the bidding strategies without information. As in the low cost 
treatment almost all subjects always bought the available information, this data is not reliable, 
as the remaining few observations are probably subject to a strong selection effect or mere 
errors.  
Treatment Mean Bid Prediction 
2nd Price (c=8)  40.6 (1.74) =50 
English (c=8)  36.7 (1.64) >50 
Table 2.7: Mean Bids without Information in the High Cost Treatments 
However, for both high cost treatments we have an about 50% rate for information acquisition 
which is not due to learning or timing effects, but highly stable. Therefore we can report the 
mean bids for these treatments in table 2.7. Given our parameterisation, the optimal bid in the 
second-price auction should be 50 and in the English auction without information the optimal 
bid respectively time for dropping out should be between 50 and 66.2. On average, this must 
be strictly greater than 50. Again, the experimental results clearly depart from these predic-
tions. In both treatments we find severe underbidding, which is difficult to explain on the 
grounds of our initial model.  
2.4.4 Further Analyses 
The robustness of our main results is further corroborated with the results of regression ana-
lyses. For the result of excess information acquisition we run logit regressions with random 
effects, separately for the two formats. These confirm that the round of the auction does not 
affect the information acquisition behaviour. Also the outcome of the previous round does not 
significantly influence the information acquisition behaviour, as one might argue.  
For the bidding behaviour we run standard linear regression as reported in table 2.8. Here the 
dummy variable high_cost takes the low cost treatments as a baseline for comparison and 
shows significantly lower bids for the high cost treatments.  
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Dependent Variable: Bid 
Variables Model 1 
Intercept 
 
7.50*** 
(2.167) 
High_Cost 
 
-1.67** 
(0.771) 
Dynamic_Format 
 
-9.45*** 
(0.823) 
Valuation 
 
0.61*** 
(0.017) 
Buy_Info 
 
16.34*** 
(1.304) 
Round 
 
0.07 
(0.071) 
N observations 2400 
Prob > F 0.000 
MSE 20.14 8² 0.456 
Table 2.8: Linear Regression (robust standard errors) 
Next, the dummy variable dynamic_format takes the second-price auction as a baseline and 
confirms that the average bids in the dynamic format are significantly lower. The variable 
valuation takes the valuation associated with each bid and shows a highly significant relation-
ship between valuation and bid. Therefore, we can exclude arbitrary behaviour or simple mis-
takes as an explanation for the intriguing underbidding effect as already described. Also in 
line with our hypotheses and results we integrate a dummy variable buy_info into the regres-
sion model and find that bids are significantly higher, when subjects have acquired informa-
tion about their valuation. This does not conflict with the fact that we find underbidding for 
both cases, with and without information acquisition. However, it indicates that the underbid-
ding effect must be much more prevailing without prior information acquisition. Finally, the 
control variable for round, associating the round with every bid, is not significant. This is fur-
ther proving that there is no trend or learning effect in our data. 
2.5 Discussion 
As the risk-neutral rational choice model presented in section 2 is inconsistent with the ex-
perimental results we discuss possible alternative explanations of the observed bidder behav-
iour. We consider risk aversion and anticipated regret as potential explanations for our data. 
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2.5.1 Risk Aversion 
Our hypotheses for the experiment were derived from a model with risk neutral bidders. In 
what follows, we show that assuming risk aversion fails to explain the excessive information 
acquisition, observed in the high cost treatment of the second-price auction. Moreover, we can 
show that risk-averse bidders would acquire less information than predicted by the risk-
neutral model which contradicts our experimental findings even more. As a consequence, we 
reject risk-aversion as an explanation for the observed data.  
Suppose bidder 1 is risk averse with a concave utility function :2. If bidder 1 decides not to 
buy information his bid % will be lower than 	. To see this consider the maximisation 
problem of bidder 1 once he decided not to buy information. 
max; < < :  
==
=
;
=
>> 
The first order condition for this problem is: 
? :  %=== >  :  %  0. 
We know that   50	  0. By definition all risk-averse individuals dislike zero-mean 
risks. It follows :  % A 0. Hence the optimal bid must be % A 50. 
Given the equilibrium behaviour of the informed bidders the decision whether to buy informa-
tion or not is the choice between two random variables. If bidder 1 decides to buy information 
his pay-off is: 
2B  
  maxC  , 0D  
. 
If bidder 1 decides not to acquire information, the pay-off is: 
EB  F)GHI;%*  ).17 
The maximal 
%, for which a risk-neutral bidder would acquire information, is 
%  2B	 EB	. We will show that :2B  
%	  :EB	 A 0.  
                                                          
17
  χ)·* denotes the indicator function. 
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Firstly, define 2B=  2B  2B	 and EB=  EB  EB	. Then with KL, :, 2B= denote the risk 
premium of 2B= at wealth level L. It follows: 
:2B  
%	  :EB	 A 0 
M :2B  2B	 N EB		  :EB	 A 0 
M  :2B= N EB		  :EB	 A 0 
M  :EB	  KEB	, :, 2B=	  :EB	  KEB	, :, EB=	 A 0 
M  KEB	, :, 2B=  KEB	, :, EB=. 
For small risks we can use the Arrow-Pratt approximation and the last statement holds true 
whenever O1PEB=	 A O1P[2B=	. For the parameterisation of the experiment we get: O1PEB=	 A1.4 and O1P[2B=	  1. 6S, whenever % A 50.  
We can conclude that risk-averse bidders have a smaller willingness to pay for information 
than risk-neutral bidders in the second-price auction. Accordingly, the maximum willingness 
to pay for information of risk neutral bidders is such that 2B  
%	  ET 	, i.e. the expecta-
tions of the relevant random variables are equal but the pay-off from not buying information 
and bidding % is less volatile. Risk-averse subjects then prefer not to buy information.  
2.5.2 Regret Avoidance  
In the following, we put forward regret avoidance as a model extension in line with our re-
sults. The ex-ante unknown valuations in the two auction formats might cause regret in two 
ways. First of all, the uninformed bidder might bid too high and as a result experience a nega-
tive pay-off. Secondly, the bidder might bid too low despite having the highest valuation and 
thus foregoing a win, which also causes regret ex-post. Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) as well 
as Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007) show that the experience of regret depends on the 
feedback provided. The subjects in this experiment only learn their valuation if they buy in-
formation. Hence they can suffer regret from paying too much. Since they remain uninformed 
otherwise, they cannot experience ex-post regret from not having won an auction despite hav-
ing a high enough valuation. Based on this feedback procedure, only regret from overpaying 
can arise. 
If a bidder anticipates such regret, it is already established for other experimental auctions that 
he changes his bidding strategy accordingly (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2007, 2008; 
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Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay, 2007). Furthermore, we show that he likewise adapts his information 
acquisition strategy. Therefore we adapt the model of Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) to the 
auction set-up provided with the initial model and used in the experiment.  
Second-Price-Auction 
Assuming a bidder does not acquire his valuation and bids according to his expected valua-
tion, then winner’s regret in the second-price auction is defined in the following utility func-
tion for bidder i: 
(4)  :,   U       P  0 V
W    1X>  LXYW  /  1X>  LXYW  Z[Y\Y  
Here  is the highest bid of the competitors and P·:  ^  is the regret function, which 
is assumed to be non-negative and non-decreasing. The informed bidders do not experience 
regret, as they have the weakly dominant strategy of bidding valuation. However, if a bidder 
chooses to remain uninformed his best reply % to the other informed bidders it the solution to 
the following:18 
(5)  max; ? ?    =;= FCGHIGHDP  >_>_`a 
The first order condition amount to: 
(6)b? ;%=  %  P%  >_ N ? ;%  %>_c   1W%_`a %  0 
If r is strictly positive on a subset of 0,50	 with Lebesgue measure larger than 0, it directly 
follows that: % / 	 and further:  
(7)  ? ?    =;%= FCGHIGHDP  >_>_`a 
A d012C	, D  e 
A bidder will acquire information if the expected utility of acquiring information is higher 
than the expected utility of remaining uninformed:  
                                                          
18
  Ff· denotes the indicator function with Ff2  1 W 2 g hand Ff2  0 [ij\PLY\. 
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(8)  d012C	, D  e  
 
 < <    =
;%
= FCGHIGHDP  >_>_`a 
Comparing (8) and (1) with using inequality (7) has the following result on bidder’s behav-
iour accounting for anticipated regret. In the second-price auction with regret, there is a cutoff 
k - 
 so that bidder 1 acquires information if 
 A 
k. Hence he only dispenses with the in-
formation acquisition for a cost 
 - 
k. Consequently, he acquires information for costs 
above the threshold predicted in the initial standard model. This prediction is consistent with 
the result of excess information acquisition. Moreover if bidder 1 remains uninformed, he 
bids only % / 	. This explains the experimental data exhibiting an underbidding effect 
in the high cost treatments, where the bidders remain uninformed.  
English Auction 
The utility function for bidder i with regret in the English auction is defined as:  
(9)  :,   l       P  0 V
W    1X>  LXYW  /  1X>  LXYW  Z[Y\Y  
Here p denotes the price at which the last competitor left the auction and the regret function P· is assumed to have the same characteristics as for the second-price auction above. As a 
result informed bidders have a weakly dominant strategy in the English auction and thus 
never experience regret.  
As already argued, in the English auction the information acquisition decision is only made, if 
one competitor remains. To formalise the trade-off between the cost of information acquisi-
tion, the probability of winning and the risk of buying at an unfavourable price including re-
gret we define analogously to section 2.2.2:  
k, 
  max,     |  	  
 and 
"k  < <     =
;
= F)GHIGm*P  >_>_ |   
k, 
 and "k correspond to bidders 1’s expected payoff when the current price is  and 
one other bidder remains active. For a full characterisation of the equilibrium we define for 
each 
: 
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(10) k%%
  sup)  0,1	|k, 
  "k* and 
(11) k%
  inf)  0,1	|max,    N rmaxp, v  v	  
  0 *. 
Here   is the valuation of the last remaining competitor. Comparing (10) and (11) to the ra-
tional choice model in (2) and (3) using inequality (7) yields the following predictions for the 
English auction with regret. First, there exists k%
 / %
,  k%%
 - %%
 1X> % /	 so that with two competitors remaining bidder 1 does not acquire information but re-
mains in the auction until  / max )k%
, %*.  
If there is only one competitor remaining and k%
 - %%
, then bidder 1 also does not 
acquire information and bids until the price 	. However, if there is only one competitor 
remaining and k%
 / %%
 and if  g k%
, k%%
	 then bidder 1 acquires information 
and bids up to   %. Further, for  - k%%
 bidder 1 drops out and for  / k%
 bidder 1 
stays in the auction. This means that with k%
 / % 
 and with k%%
 - %%
 the range 
of prices where information is acquired is extended. Accordingly, regret in the English auc-
tion can also explain the excess information acquisition. Moreover, regarding the bids with 
anticipated regret, uninformed bidders drop out before the price reaches their expected valua-
tion which is consistent with our underbidding effect observed in the experiment. Finally, 
regret can also play a role in explaining the experimental result of premature information ac-
quisition. Since k%
 / % 
 not only more information is acquired with regret, it is also 
acquired at lower prices, i.e. at an earlier stage.  
Estimation of the Regret Coefficient 
Bringing together experimental data and the extended theory with anticipated regret we can 
estimate the regret. We assume a linear regret function:  
P2  op 20 V W 2 / 0[ij\PLY\ 
Solving equation (6) for   4 with valuations uniformly distributed on 0,100	, as used in 
the experiment we obtain:  
%  √1Np 1p 100 
With p^ 0 and thus no regret the optimal bid in the second-price auction without information 
approaches %  50, as in the initial rational choice model. However with increasing regret p 
- 25 - 
increases and % decreases, i.e. with high anticipated regret bids of uninformed bidders de-
cline. Based on our experimental results for the second-price auction with %  40.6 we can 
estimate the regret coefficient as p 1.25.19 Putting this result into perspective we compare it 
to other auctions with regret. Here Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) find p 1.23 and Engel-
brecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) p 0.62. Both results are in line with the order of magni-
tude we observe, corroborating that using anticipated regret to explain excess information 
acquisition as put forward in this contribution has also a solid empirical underpinning.  
2.6 Conclusions and Outlook 
We have provided the first experiment on auctions with information acquisition, studying 
how much information is acquired and how it is used. This setting is highly relevant to real 
world situations such as corporate takeovers, where valuations are usually unknown at first. 
We derived our hypotheses from a risk neutral rational choice model for auctions with the 
opportunity for information acquisition. The most crucial discrepancy between theory and our 
experimental results is the excessive information acquisition behaviour for high costs, where 
the price of information is not compensated by the average expected profit. This effect is very 
robust and prevails in both, the second-price sealed-bid and the English auction. In line with 
this finding, the experiment also showed that subjects in the English auction fail to account 
for the additional information provided by the number of competitors. This leads to premature 
information acquisition strategies. Finally, considering the bidding strategies of both informed 
and uninformed bidders we observe that subjects continuously and significantly underbid.  
On the basis of our results, risk aversion as a standard model extension could not explain the 
behaviour we observed. However, adapting the initial theory with anticipated regret, i.e. the 
regret from overpaying, which was applicable in our setting, can accommodate the experi-
mental results. It explains excess information acquisition and underbidding behaviour. 
                                                          
19
   For the English auction we cannot directly estimate the regret coefficient, as the mean bids in this treatment 
only impose a lower bound on the bids. In this treatment the auction was ended, as soon as the last competi-
tor dropped out, that the maximum bid could not be observed in these cases. However, based on the lower 
bound of bids we can estimate an upper bound for the regret coefficient of p 1.97. 
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2.7 Appendix 
2.7.1 Additional Results 
 
Figure 2.5: Individual Frequency of Information Acquisition (2nd Price Low) 
 
  
Figure 2.6: Individual Frequency of Information Acquisition (English Low) 
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Figure 2.7: Individual Frequency of Information Acquisition (2nd Price High) 
 
  
Figure 2.8: Individual Frequency of Information Acquisition (English High) 
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2.7.2 Instructions 
Instructions 
Welcome and thank you for participating in today’s experiment. Please read the following 
instructions thoroughly. These are the same for all participants. Please do not hesitate to ask if 
you have any questions. However, we ask you to raise your hand and wait for us to come and 
assist you. We also ask you to restrain from communicating with other participants from now 
on until the end of the experiment. Please ensure that your mobile phone is switched off. Vio-
lating these rules can result in an exclusion from this experiment. 
You will be able to earn money during this experiment. The amount of your payout depends 
on your decisions. Each participant will receive his payout individually in cash at the end of 
the experiment. You will receive 2.50 € as a show-up fee for your presence as well as the sum 
of payouts from each round. Possible losses will at the end of the experiment be set against 
the show-up fee (if you accumulated losses on top of that, you will be required to pay these in 
cash at the end of the experiment). During the experiment payouts will be stated in the cur-
rency "ECU" (Experimental Currency Unit). 10 ECU are equivalent to 1 Euro (10 ECU = 1 
EUR). The experiment consists of 20 payout relevant rounds.  
Course of a Round (Treatment: 2nd Price Auction) 
During this experiment you will take part in an auction of a fictional good. You will be bid-
ding in a group of four with three other participants. These three participants are pre-
programmed bid robots. Their exact functioning will be described in more detail in the fol-
lowing.  
Information prior to the Auction:  
The fictional good is of different value for each bidder. Therefore prior to each round the 
valuation is determined for each participant. This valuation is between 0 and 100 ECU and 
each number has the same probability. However, during this auction you do not have any in-
formation about your valuation at first. Nevertheless, at the cost of 2 ECU/ 8ECU you can at 
any time acquire knowledge of your exact valuation. By contrast, the bid robots know their 
exact valuation of the fictional good. Their valuation, just as your own valuation, is between 0 
and 100 ECU and each number has the same probability. The three bid robots will always 
have different valuations.  
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Profits and Losses during the Auction:  
All bidders simultaneously make an offer for the fictional good. The bidder with the highest 
offer wins the auction. The price for the fictional good is set at the amount of the second high-
est bid. The winner of the auction has to pay this price for the good. If multiple bidders make 
the same offer during one round, then the winner is randomly determined. (Please note: You 
will not be able to revoke an offer or buy any information, once an offer has been submitted.) 
The payout for the winner of an auction is calculated from his previously, randomly deter-
mined valuation of the good minus the price at the end of the auction. (Please note: You will 
incur a loss if your offer is higher than your valuation of the good. Losses will at the end of 
the experiment be set against the show-up fee. However, if you accumulate losses on top of 
that, you will be required to pay these in cash at the end of the experiment.) Additionally, if 
you have bought information at the cost of 2 ECU/ 8 ECU, then this amount will be deducted 
from your profit or entered as loss.  
Feedback after an Auction Round: 
At the end of an auction round you will be informed, whether you won the fictional good with 
your bid. Additionally, you will be informed about the second highest bid and therefore the 
price of the fictional good as well as your individual profit for this round.  
Course of a Round (Treatment: English Auction) 
During this experiment you will take part in an auction of a fictional good. You will be bid-
ding in a group of four with three other participants. These three participants are pre-
programmed bid robots. Their exact functioning will be described in more detail in the fol-
lowing.  
Information prior to the Auction:  
The fictional good is of different value for each bidder. Therefore prior to each round the 
valuation is determined for each participant. This valuation is between 0 and 100 ECU and 
each number has the same probability. However, during this auction you do not have any in-
formation about your valuation at first. Nevertheless, at the cost of 2 ECU/ 8ECU you can at 
any time acquire knowledge of your exact valuation. By contrast, the bid robots know their 
exact valuation of the fictional good. Their valuation, just as your own valuation, is between 0 
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and 100 ECU and each number has the same probability. The three bid robots will always 
have different valuations.  
Profits and Losses during the Auction:  
The auction begins at 0 ECU for the fictional good. The bid will increase every 2 seconds by 
1 ECU. A price clock indicates the current bid in ECU during the auction. You will also be 
able to see at any time of the auction how many bidders are still active and you will be able to 
buy information on your exact valuation. You can pause the price clock at wish by clicking 
the button "Pause/ Continue". All participants automatically continue bidding until they leave 
the auction round by clicking the button "Quit" on their screen. The auction ends automatical-
ly once only one bidder is left active. The last active bidder wins the auction and has to pay 
the last price on the price-clock, i.e. the price when the second last bidder dropped out. If mul-
tiple bidders quit simultaneously, then the winner of this round is randomly determined. 
The payout for the winner of an auction is calculated from his previously, randomly deter-
mined valuation of the good minus the price at the end of the auction. (Please note: You will 
incur a loss if your offer is higher than your valuation of the good. Losses will at the end of 
the experiment be set against the show-up fee. However, if you accumulate losses on top of 
that, you will be required to pay these in cash at the end of the experiment.) Additionally, if 
you have bought information at the cost of 2 ECU/ 8 ECU, then this amount will be deducted 
from your profit or entered as loss.  
Feedback after an Auction Round: 
At the end of an auction round you will be informed, whether you won the fictional good with 
your bid. Additionally, you will be informed about the second highest bid and therefore the 
price of the fictional good as well as your individual profit for this round.  
End of the Experiment 
All auction rounds of this experiment are payout relevant. After completion of all 20 auction 
rounds, your payouts for each round as well as your overall result will be presented to you in 
a summary on your screen. After that we will ask you to fill in a short questionnaire concern-
ing the experiment.  
Please raise your hand, if you have any further questions. 
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Screenshot Example (Treatment: 2nd Price Auction): 
 
 
 
Screenshot Example (Treatment: English Auction): 
 
 
 
Begin/ pause/ con-
tinue auction 
Leave auction at 
current price 
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3 Demand for Non-Instrumental Information in Auctions 
3.1 Introduction 
Economic theory provides clear predictions regarding the usage of information and the forma-
tion of strategies in auctions (Milgrom and Weber, 1982; Rasmussen, 2006; Vickrey, 1961). 
The second-price sealed-bid auction is the most studied and best understood format, both 
from a theoretical and empirical point of view. However, it still maintains puzzles such as 
overbidding, regret and spite motives which constantly show that human bidders are not ad-
hering to all theoretical predictions. Some departures from strict rationality in the context of 
auctions have already been covered by the existing literature (Ariely and Simonson, 2003; 
Lucking-Reiley, 2000b; Ockenfels and Roth, 2006), but the provision of additional non-
instrumental information has not been studied in this context, yet. Information is non-
instrumental when it cannot directly be used in the formation of a rational bidding strategy. 
This contribution aims at studying the value of information in auctions. Previous works have 
relied on the rational choice framework calculating a monetary pay-off of information with a 
strategic or instrumental value for the bidders (Compte and Jehiel, 2007; Persico, 2000). In 
this line of research, first experiments have already shown that subjects deviate from the ra-
tional choice model, when assessing the value of information in auctions (Gretschko and Ra-
jko, 2011). Considering these new insights, where the additional information is essentially 
overvalued, the related supplementary work with non-instrumental information can help or-
ganising and reviewing current results. Non-instrumental information should not change a 
decision from a standard rational point of view, but it might reduce uncertainty about the re-
alisation of a decision as it updates some irrelevant priors. For simple decision lotteries, Eliaz 
and Schotter (2007, 2010) argue that decision makers may derive some benefit from non-
instrumental information. If that also applies to auctions, this is would be a starting point for 
the explanation of the valuation of additional information in such games. In particular the un-
derstanding of motives for the excess information acquisition behaviour found by Gretschko 
and Rajko (2011) can be improved. Hence an experiment is designed which extends the sec-
ond-price sealed-bid auction, with an information acquisition option. Here, according to stan-
dard theory non-instrumental information should not be assessed or valued at all by the bid-
ders. However, the results show that on the contrary, there is a positive demand for non-
instrumental information. This demand is significantly dependent only on the costs of infor-
- 33 - 
mation and not on the group size of competing bidders. Further, with non-instrumental infor-
mation the individual bids are characterised by underbidding behaviour.  
The remainder of this chapter unfolds as follows. Section 2 combines literature on non-
instrumental information, auctions with information acquisition and standard experimental 
results in second-price auctions. On these grounds some hypotheses are derived. The experi-
mental design and procedures are presented in section 3. In section 4 the main results are dis-
cussed. Finally, section 5 gives a short conclusion and outlook on future research.  
3.2 Related Literature and Hypotheses 
Investigating the use of non-instrumental information in auctions embarks upon a very recent 
line of research. Up to now, the experimental literature on auctions has mainly envisaged de-
viations from equilibrium play in terms of the bidding strategies such as overbidding. The 
antecedent question of how the information provided in an auction scenario is processed has 
not been explicitly addressed.  
Nonetheless, the idea of studying the impact of non-instrumental information on economic 
decision making has already found profound evidence in a different context. Foremostly, 
Eliaz and Schotter (2007) have demonstrated that players buy non-instrumental information in 
a standard one player decision experiment consisting of various lotteries. Moreover, it has 
been theoretically and experimentally validated that players can derive some additional utility 
from the perceived increase in confidence, simply when having more information for making 
a decision (Eliaz and Schotter, 2010). According to their model, anticipated wins are also part 
of the utility function. Simultaneously to these advances, the literature on auction theory 
started to deal with the process of information acquisition in auctions (Compte and Jehiel, 
2007; Persico, 2000). However, this literature assumes that the information to be acquired is 
instrumental for the formation of a bidding strategy. Bringing this problem to the laboratory, 
Gretschko and Rajko (2011) already confirmed that players acquire and use this information. 
Expanding on these results, this study investigates how participants of an auction respond to 
the costly provision of non-instrumental information.  
Here the information to be acquired does not have any impact on the bidding strategies, ac-
cording to the standard models widely accepted and used in auction theory. The non-
instrumental information in this context is the highest valuation of the competing bidding 
agents in a second-price sealed-bid auction. This additional information is costly but not stra-
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tegically useful, as there is a weakly dominant strategy of precisely bidding one’s valuation 
independent of the valuations of others. Consequently, this information should never be 
bought. Nevertheless, based on the findings of Eliaz and Schotter (2007, 2010), it is expected 
that in an auction set-up there is also a positive demand for non-instrumental information.  
Hypothesis 1: There is positive demand for non-instrumental information. 
Two previous studies have already used non-instrumental information in auctions and found 
first evidence for such a demand. However, these studies focus on bidding strategies and on 
finding an explanation for overbidding, rather than analysing the actual information acquisi-
tion behaviour (Andreoni et al., 2007; Cooper and Fang, 2008). Cooper and Fang (2008) find 
that non-instrumental information is bought in experimental second-price auctions. However, 
they do not systematically vary the costs of information acquisition and the group structure. 
Varying the information cost allows testing an important hypothesis. If there is a systematic 
effect based on players’ reasoning, then there should be significantly less information acquisi-
tion in the high cost treatments. 
Hypothesis 2: There is less demand for non-instrumental information at a higher cost. 
As already argued, in the second-price-auction truthfully bidding one’s valuation is a weakly 
dominant strategy. With the non-instrumental information acquisition option, this prediction 
still holds. However, the most pivotal experiment on bidding strategies by Kagel and Levin 
(1993) finds more over- than underbidding. Furthermore, Cooper and Fang (2008) and An-
dreoni et al. (2007) report a significant impact of non-instrumental information on players’ 
bidding strategies. In fact, both studies find overbidding in their experimental data. Hence it is 
expected, that the bidding strategies are systematically affected by the non-instrumental in-
formation.  
Hypothesis 3: Non-instrumental information leads to overbidding. 
Finally, there has not been any variation of group composition in previous experiments. How-
ever, Kagel and Levin (1993) have already found that under- and overbidding effect in stan-
dard auctions are susceptible to group size, i.e. the amount of under- and overbidding increas-
es with the number of bidders. As a consequence, the next hypothesis addresses the number of 
bidders in an auction. 
Hypothesis 4: Deviations from valuation bidding increase with the number of bidders. 
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3.3 Experimental Design and Procedures 
The experimental design aims at the utilisation of additionally provided non-instrumental in-
formation in a standard second-price sealed-bid auction.20 The item being auctioned was a 
hypothetical good associated with independent private values for the bidders.21 These private 
valuations were known to the bidders at the beginning of each auction round. Overall, this 
auction game was played for 20 rounds. The profits were calculated as the winner’s valuation 
minus the final price and, if applicable, minus the costs of information acquisition. In the ex-
periment each human subject was matched in a group with one respectively three bidding 
robots. These robots were pre-programmed to play the weakly dominant strategy of the sec-
ond-price auction, i.e. bidding their true valuation. Knowing that one was competing with a 
rational bidding robot rather than a human agent, there was no social interaction in this ex-
periment. This systematically rules out any confusion due to uncertainty or strategic reasoning 
about other human players.  
Overall, all relevant information for the bidding strategy is provided in this auction. Neverthe-
less, an information acquisition feature offering additional non-instrumental information at a 
cost of c=2 or c=8 was additionally provided.22 As non-instrumental information, the private 
value of the one competing bidding robot with the highest valuation was chosen.  
 Information Costs 
Group Size Low Cost High Cost 
2 players c = 2 c = 8 
4 players c = 2 c = 8 
Table 3.1: Experimental Treatments 
Using different cost parameters, the demand for information can be controlled. Information 
acquisition was only possible prior to submitting the sealed-bid offer. In addition, the group 
size was varied in order to assess whether the non-instrumental information is valued differ-
ently, when there is only one competitor and hence the valuations of all bidders are implicitly 
                                                          
20
   For the full experimental instructions refer to the appendix.    
21
  The distribution of the private values is a uniform distribution ranging from 0 to 100, and the private values 
are redrawn for every round and for all bidders. 
22
  Based on the valuation profiles drawn in this experiment, the cost of c=2 came down to 10% of overall prof-
its for the human subjects and c=8 meant a 40% dispense of overall profits.  
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known ex ante when information acquisition is chosen. Overall, the experiment yields the 2 x 
2 design for the four treatments as depicted in table 3.1. The feedback procedure was the same 
for all treatments. Subjects learned each round whether they won the hypothetical good, the 
final price of the good, their bid as a reminder and the overall profit or loss for this auction 
including the costs of information acquisition if applicable. In order to have the costs of in-
formation acquisitions assessed in a realistic manner, it was stressed in the instructions that all 
losses in the experiment must be paid to the experimenter after the experiment.  
The experimental sessions were conducted in November 2011 at the Cologne Laboratory for 
Economic Research (CLER). 30 subjects per treatment and 120 subjects overall participated 
with average payments being 11.83 € including a guaranteed show-up fee of 2.50 €. Subjects 
stayed in the laboratory for about 55 minutes. The recruitment was organised with the online 
recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) and the experiment itself was programmed with 
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
3.4 Experimental Analysis and Results 
3.4.1 Excess Acquisition of Non-Instrumental Information 
The first two hypotheses are based on the fact, that it is always a weakly dominant strategy to 
bid one’s valuation in a second-price auction. Hence the instrumental value of knowing the 
highest valuation of one’s competitors is zero. The demand for this non-instrumental informa-
tion must be zero according to both standard auction theory and models for auctions with in-
formation acquisition. But in fact, as exhibited in figure 3.1, the average amount of informa-
tion acquisition is significantly higher than zero, in all four treatment variations.23 So in all 
treatments subjects do acquire non-instrumental information at a substantial cost. Also as hy-
pothesised, the demand for non-instrumental information is higher in the two low cost treat-
ments.24 The size of competition, however, being either one or three bidding robots, does not 
make a significant difference to the acquisition behaviour.25  
                                                          
23
  T-test: p-value < 0.0001 for all four treatments.  
24
   T-test: p-value < 0.0001 for comparing n=2 and n=4 across costs. 
25
  T-test: p-value = 0.62 for comparing the low cost treatments and p-value = 0.35 for the high cost treatments. 
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Figure 3.1: Non-Instrumental Information Acquisitions (all rounds) 
Furthermore, when considering the demand for non-instrumental information for the individ-
ual auction rounds, it becomes evident that there is some immediate learning effect in the first 
five rounds (figure 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.2: Development of Information Acquisition Frequencies 
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After the initial rounds, however, the demand for non-instrumental information stabilises for 
all treatments. Even though there is some learning effect in the course of the experiment, the 
main effect of excess acquisition of non-instrumental information does not vanish.26  
One can consider the possible objection that some players drive the effect especially in the 
high cost treatments and most players act rational by not buying information at all. Consider-
ing the data in table 3.2, 17-37% of players do not buy any information and thus act in accor-
dance with the standard theory. 23-37% of players just buy the non-instrumental information 
occasionally, i.e. once or twice. However, the majority of players (33-60%) buy the informa-
tion more than twice which indicates that this is a repeated conscious decision.  
Treatment Percentage of players 
buying no info 
Percentage of players 
buying ≤ 2 
Percentage of players 
buying > 2 
c=2, n=2 17% 30% 53% 
c=2, n=4 17% 23% 60% 
c=8, n=2 37% 30% 33% 
c=8, n=4 23% 37% 40% 
Table 3.2:  Player Types for Information Acquisition   
Altogether, this means that subjects acquiring non-instrumental information must derive some 
utility or confidence from this information which they deliberately and repeatedly buy.  
3.4.2 Bidding Strategies 
In the following, the bidding behaviour of players is characterised in terms of over- and un-
derbidding.27 First, all bidders who have not previously acquired information are considered. 
Then, all bidders who had the additional non-instrumental information available are dis-
cussed. Regarding the bidding strategies without information acquisition, valuation bidding 
prevails, with only slight differences between under- and overbidding (see table 3.3). 
                                                          
26
  The contingencies on different rounds and the fact whether the previous round was won are analysed further 
with a fixed effect regression model in the following sections.   
27
  Valuation bidding is defined as bidding exactly one’s valuation. Underbidding is every bid under the valua-
tion and overbidding every bid above the valuation, irrespective of the size of this deviation.  
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Treatment underbidding valuation bidding overbidding 
c=2, n=2 29.7% 57.4% 13.0% 
c=2, n=4 19.8% 64.0% 16.3% 
c=8, n=2 36.6% 36.8% 26.7% 
c=8, n=4 24.7% 46.9% 28.4% 
Table 3.3:  Bidding Strategies without Non-Instrumental Information Acquisition  
Over all treatments approximately 50% of the subjects exactly bid valuation, which is in line 
with a recent study by Garratt et al. (2012) finding under- and overbidding of comparable 
magnitude.  
More striking are the bidding strategies subjects employ after they have acquired the non-
instrumental information (see table 3.4). Whereas the literature on standard second price auc-
tions is usually concerned with resolving the overbidding phenomenon (Cooper and Fang, 
2008), the data on bidding strategies with non-instrumental information from this experiment 
reveals a much stronger underbidding effect. Across all four treatments the average underbid-
ding with information, i.e. after information acquisition, is 73%, whilst valuation bidding only 
occurs in 12% and overbidding in 15% of the cases.  
Treatment underbidding valuation bidding overbidding 
c=2, n=2 68.2% 21.9% 9.9% 
c=2, n=4 73.0% 12.5% 14.5% 
c=8, n=2 76.2% 9.5% 14.3% 
c=8, n=4 75.3% 3.2% 21.5% 
Table 3.4:  Bidding Strategies with Non-Instrumental Information Acquisition  
With regard to hypothesis 3, in this experiment there is strong underbidding of subjects, who 
acquire additional information. This underbidding effect is similar to the results obtained by 
Gretschko and Rajko (2011). However, the effect is even more manifest in this experiment 
where with information acquisition only 11.8% of auctions exhibit valuation bidding in the 
second-price auction. Gretschko and Rajko (2011) have still found 37.5% of auctions to 
comply with valuation bidding. Thus the non-instrumental information strongly affects bid-
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ding strategies in a manner rarely found in the experimental auction literature and hypothesis 
3 is rejected.  
The generally strong impact of underbidding in this experiment is also fortified by the size of 
underbidding. Whilst without information both over- and underbidding are small in size, for 
the auctions with non-instrumental information the effect is severe, as illustrated in table 3.5 
(standard errors are in parentheses).  
Treatment Mean Bid Mean Valuation 
c=2, n=2 52.67 (2.14) 68.76 (1.78) 
c=2, n=4 59.81 (1.60) 72.22 (1.39) 
c=8, n=2 52.42 (3.05) 75.84 (1.69) 
c=8, n=4 60.69 (2.77) 77.55 (1.93) 
Table 3.5: Mean Bids for Underbidding with Non-Instrumental Information 
So when deciding to underbid, subjects do not only deviate by small amounts from their true 
and known valuation, but underbid by 17.2 on average. In order to put this number into pers-
pective, the amount of underbidding found in the same treatments, but without knowledge of 
the non-instrumental information, was only 0.63. Thus bidding strategies were strongly af-
fected by the non-instrumental information. Finally, the actual cost parameter of the informa-
tion has little impact on the height of discounting bids.  
With reference to hypothesis 4, in this experiment there is only partial support. When consi-
dering all auctions unconditional of information acquisition there is no difference in valuation 
bidding between the two low cost treatments.28 However, for the high cost treatments there is 
a significant effect where valuation bidding increases with the number of bidders.29   
                                                          
28
  Mann-Whitney Test: p-value = 0.772. 
29
  Mann-Whitney Test: p-value = 0.003 
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3.4.3 Further Analyses 
This section uses fixed effect regression models to control for additional influences which 
might affect the results previously obtained. By choice of the regression model one also con-
trols for unobserved heterogeneity between the individual subjects.  
First, regressions are run to analyse the information acquisition behaviour (see table 3.6).30 In 
this regard, the previous results have already established that subjects acquire significantly 
more information than theory predicts and that they even do more so, when the costs for in-
formation acquisition are lower. 
Dependent Variable: Buy_Info 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 
 
0.055*** 
(0.016) 
0.074*** 
(0.018) 
Valuation 
 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
First_Rounds (1-5) 
 
0.114*** 
(0.015) 
0.070*** 
(0.015) 
Won_Previous_Round  -0.020 
(0.013) 
N observations 2400 2280 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 8² 0.05 0.04 
Table 3.6: Fixed-Effects Regression on Information Acquisition 
According to the first model the information acquisition behaviour is significantly higher in 
the first five auction rounds as the significant coefficient of the dummy variable first_rounds 
shows. Of course, also the valuation has a small, but significant impact on the information 
buying behaviour. The second model further corroborates the robustness of the results, as the 
success of winning in the previous round has no significant impact on the information acquisi-
tions.  
Next, the main results regarding bidding behaviour are also analysed with fixed-effects re-
gressions (see table 3.7). Model 1 starts with the valuation of the subjects as an independent 
variable and confirms its highly significant impact. Also the previous result of severe under-
bidding is verified with the regression, where the coefficient buy_info for buying information 
                                                          
30
  All regression models are with standard errors in parentheses. Moreover, standard OLS regressions yield the 
same overall results for both dependent variables.  
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is significant and highly negative. This substantiates the robustness of the underbidding effect 
found here. Moreover, the base model shows that the bidding behaviour in the first 5 rounds is 
different from the remaining auction rounds. Model 2 additionally controls for the highest 
valuation of the competing bidding robots, i.e. the non-instrumental information. This indi-
cates a significant effect on the bids, but the effect is relatively small in its magnitude. With 
model 3 it can be shown that it has no impact on bids, whether the previous round was won.  
 Dependent Variable: Bid 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 
 
6.272*** 
(0.817) 
3.861*** 
(1.029) 
3.176*** 
(1.098) 
Valuation 
 
0.883*** 
(0.126) 
0.869*** 
(0.013) 
0.866*** 
(0.013) 
Max_Valuation_Competition  0.052*** 
(0.014) 
0.066*** 
(0.013) 
Buy_Info 
 
-10.360*** 
(1.044) 
-10.485*** 
(1.042) 
- 10.271*** 
(1.079) 
First_Rounds (1-5) 
 
-3.174*** 
(0.763) 
-3.517*** 
(0.766) 
-2.213** 
(0.776) 
Won_Previous_Round   -0.132 
(0.631) 
N observations 2400 2400 2280 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 8² 0.65 0.65 0.68 
Table 3.7: Fixed-Effects Regression on Bids 
3.4.4 Discussion  
This experiment relates to two new strands of literature, i.e. non-instrumental information and 
information acquisition in auctions. With respect to the first one, the experimental data gives 
credence to the basic insight by Eliaz and Schotter (2007) that non-instrumental information 
matters in economic decision making. In the applied scenario of an auction rather than a lot-
tery choice experiment, the basic result persists.  
Putting the experimental results into perspective with Gretschko and Rajko (2011) helps 
shedding light on their results, as it not only confirms that information acquisition is not in 
line with rational choice models, but that it is robust even in this very simple set-up. Hence 
this experiment confirms the substance of the puzzle of excess information acquisition behav-
iour and also explains some of the results from Gretschko and Rajko (2011). In particular, 
when considering the magnitudes of information acquisition in the two experiments, based on 
very similar and thus comparable designs, the strategic information acquisition for high costs 
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showed a 55% excess acquisition of information, whereas the non-instrumental information 
only exhibited 18%. Hence the motives underlying this behaviour and driving the results for 
non-instrumental information acquisition, such as a preference for confidence, could also ac-
count for some of the puzzle of excess acquisition behaviour for strategically relevant infor-
mation. Additionally, the weak underbidding effect found by Gretschko and Rajko (2011) can 
be reproduced with this experiment. In fact, this effect is even 60% stronger in the non-
instrumental information experiment at hand. 
3.5 Conclusions and Outlook 
This contribution has extended recent work on auctions with information acquisition, which 
has given a first indication of departures from rational choice in this context. In order to im-
prove the understanding of the behaviour in such auctions, the literature on non-instrumental 
information was taken up and the demand for non-instrumental information in a second-price 
auction was investigated.  
The experimental design extended a second-price sealed-bid auction with the opportunity to 
acquire non-instrumental information. Two main results were found. First, there is a substan-
tial demand for non-instrumental information, supporting the notion of a preference for confi-
dence. Secondly, the bidding strategies that players use when having acquired the additional 
information deviates from most other auction experiments. Bidding strategies hardly depend 
on the number of bidders. Nevertheless, the acquisition of non-instrumental information sub-
sequently leads to substantial underbidding; both in terms of frequency and amount of under-
bidding. Altogether, the acquisition and processing of information in auctions is a promising 
field for further research. The experimental results in this area are very strong, and yet, there 
is little theoretical work fully explaining the observed behaviour.  
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3.6 Appendix 
3.6.1 Instructions 
Instructions 
Welcome and thank you for participating in today’s experiment. Please read the following 
instructions thoroughly. These are the same for all participants. Please do not hesitate to ask if 
you have any questions. However, we ask you to raise your hand and wait for us to come and 
assist you. We also ask you to restrain from communicating with other participants from now 
on until the end of the experiment. Please ensure that your mobile phone is switched off. Vio-
lating these rules can result in an exclusion from this experiment. 
You will be able to earn money during this experiment. The amount of your payout depends 
on your decisions. Each participant will receive his payout individually in cash at the end of 
the experiment. You will receive 2.50 € as a show-up fee for your presence as well as the sum 
of payouts from each round. Possible losses will at the end of the experiment be set against 
the show-up fee (if you accumulated losses on top of that, you will be required to pay these in 
cash at the end of the experiment). During the experiment payouts will be stated in the cur-
rency "ECU" (Experimental Currency Unit). 20 ECU are equivalent to 1 Euro (20 ECU = 1 
EUR). The experiment consists of 20 payout relevant rounds.  
Course of a Round (Treatment: 2nd Price Auction) 
During this experiment you will take part in an auction of a fictional good. You will be bid-
ding in a group of two/four with one/three other participants. These one/three participants are 
pre-programmed bid robots. Their exact functioning will be described in more detail in the 
following.  
Information prior to the Auction:  
The fictional good is of different value for each bidder. Therefore prior to each round the 
valuation is determined for each participant. This valuation is between 0 and 100 ECU and 
each number has the same probability. Only your valuation is known to you. At the cost of 2 
ECU/ 8ECU you acquire the highest valuation of the competing bidding robots.   
Profits and Losses during the Auction:  
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All bidders simultaneously make an offer for the fictional good. The bidder with the highest 
offer wins the auction. The price for the fictional good is set at the amount of the second high-
est bid. The winner of the auction has to pay this price for the good. If multiple bidders make 
the same offer during one round, then the winner is randomly determined. (Please note: You 
will not be able to revoke an offer or buy any information, once an offer has been submitted.) 
The payout for the winner of an auction is calculated from his previously, randomly deter-
mined valuation of the good minus the price at the end of the auction. (Please note: You will 
incur a loss if your offer is higher than your valuation of the good. Losses will at the end of 
the experiment be set against the show-up fee. However, if you accumulate losses on top of 
that, you will be required to pay these in cash at the end of the experiment.) Additionally, if 
you have bought information, then this amount will be deducted from your profit or entered as 
loss.  
Feedback after an Auction Round: 
At the end of an auction round you will be informed, whether you won the fictional good with 
your bid. Additionally, you will be informed about the second highest bid and therefore the 
price of the fictional good as well as your individual profit for this round.  
End of the Experiment 
All auction rounds of this experiment are payout relevant. After completion of all 20 auction 
rounds, your payouts for each round as well as your overall result will be presented to you in 
a summary on your screen. Please raise your hand, if you have any further questions. 
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Screenshot Example (Treatment: 2nd Price Auction): 
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4 Risk and Ambiguity in Global Games 
4.1 Introduction 
Economic interactions, in which strategic complementarities require coordination among 
groups of players, do not automatically result in efficient outcomes.31 Assuming common 
knowledge of the payoff structure and rationality among agents, coordination games typically 
have multiple equilibria with self-fulfilling features complicating the analysis and derivation 
of possible policy implications. Bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) and speculative at-
tacks (Obstfeld, 1996) are canonical examples, where common knowledge results in indeter-
minacy of coordination outcomes. The theory of global games accounts for the fact that play-
ers often have some private information and relax the common knowledge assumption by 
perturbing the payoffs associated with according actions (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993; 
Morris and Shin, 1998, 2003). Some important work on global games assumes both public 
and private information regarding the actual game that is played (Heinemann et al., 2004). 
This important assumption can be extended to having variations of risk with respect to signal 
precision or even ambiguous information about one’s own signal precision, i.e. multiplicity of 
priors. Accounting for ambiguity is a meaningful extension for global games, as it often ap-
plies in real life scenarios. Here one would rarely know the exact precision of information, nor 
would one have reliable knowledge about the underlying distribution of signals. Accordingly, 
risk and ambiguity are a central theme for some recent theoretical advancement of global 
games (Ui, 2009). We take these theoretical predictions and experimentally investigate a 
global game framed as a speculative attack under two different types of uncertainty, i.e. risk 
and ambiguity.  
In particular we assess three main hypotheses with our experimental design. Firstly, we con-
firm the consistent use of undominated switching strategies, but the rare commitment to 
unique cut-off values, as a robust finding in global games. Our second hypothesis confirms 
excess aggressiveness in terms of individual subjects’ behaviour. We also show that this ex-
cess aggressiveness can be explained as a rational best response given certain expectations 
                                                          
31
  This chapter is joint work with Christopher Zeppenfeld. 
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regarding the other players’ behaviour. Finally, we take our experimental results to falsify the 
prediction from the model of Ui (2009), that there are opposite effects on overall coordination 
for increasing risk and ambiguity.  
Section 2 discusses the theoretical and experimental literature on global games. More impor-
tantly, it also outlines the theory of global games and its extensions for ambiguity. This yields 
the equilibrium predictions and the comparative statics for our experiment. Section 3 presents 
our experimental design and procedures. Section 4 discusses the main results. Finally, sec-
tion 5 provides a short summary.  
4.2 Global Games Theoretical Predictions and Hypotheses 
Coordination games often assume common knowledge of all payoffs and rationality of all 
players, resulting in multiple equilibria. However, many real life situations exhibit strategic 
complementarities and players who have some private information are uncertain about the 
actions of other players working towards the same end. This applies to bank runs, debt crises 
or speculative attacks. The theory of global games (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993; Morris 
and Shin, 1998, 2003) avoids the common knowledge assumption by perturbing the payoffs 
of associated actions. Instead of observing the true state of the world, players receive a noisy 
private signal. Hence, the term global games accounts for the fact that the actual game is 
drawn from a class of possible games and players can only observe the actual game with some 
noise. The main advantage global games entail is that they have a unique equilibrium, which 
is in general dominance solvable.  
In the following we derive the theoretical equilibrium predictions and comparative statics for 
the speculative attack game under both risk and ambiguity. Based on this we can determine 
the parameterisation of the game for our experimental design.  
4.2.1 The Speculative Attack Game  
We adopt the speculative attack game of Morris and Shin (1998) based on the game of com-
plete information by Obstfeld (1996). A central bank faces a continuum of speculators who 
independently decide whether or not to attack a fixed exchange rate (peg). Attacking means 
short selling of a unit of currency, which involves transaction costs 
. Whether the currency 
can be successfully devalued depends on both the state of fundamentals of the underlying 
economy (u) and the aggregate mass of attackers (Z). In the first stage of the game nature se-
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lects a state u and the central bank will abandon the peg if the aggregate mass of speculators 
short-selling is equal or exceeding some critical value Ψu. We will denote this as the hurdle 
function v:  ^ 0,1	 which assigns a critical proportion of agents needed for a devaluation 
to every possible state of fundamentals. We assume that Ψu is decreasing in u. Further, 
va0  u is a state above which the safe action is dominated by the speculative action, i.e. 
attacking is always successful no matter what the other agents do. On the other hand, if the 
economy is sufficiently strong, the central bank will maintain the peg no matter the size of the 
aggregate speculative attack. Then we obtain Ψa1  u below which the safe action domi-
nates such that attacking cannot be successful.32 The players have a simple binary choice be-
tween a speculative option (attacking) and a safe option (not attacking). This game can then 
be solved by using global games with its standard assumptions.  
We will consider action 1  1 as “attacking” the currency and action 1  0 as refraining 
from doing so. Further we assume that the payoff of successful speculation is the actual (but 
unknown) state of fundamentals while the agent receives zero if he chooses 1  1 but the 
attack fails. The payoff :1, Z, u depends on the chosen action, the aggregate mass of specu-
lators and the actual state of fundamentals. The resulting payoff structure reads 
:1, Z, u  wu, Z  Ψu0, Z / vuV 
and 
:0, Z, u  
 
where y is a standard utility function.33  
4.2.2 The Game with Risk and Ambiguity 
In the following we build on Ui (2009) to extend global games to risk and ambiguity. Accord-
ing to Ui (2009) we assume that :1, Z, u is monotonically increasing in Z and u, whereas 
                                                          
32
  In order to have a coordination problem, we require that  u / u. 
33
  We do not impose any restrictions on the functional form of v(y) besides non-satiation and non-negativity. 
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:0, Z, u is monotonically decreasing in Z and u.34 We will now follow Morris and Shin 
(1998) incorporating risk into the speculative attack model thus transforming it into a global 
game. The term risk refers to the fact that agents do no longer observe the actual state but re-
ceive an individual private signal 2  u N z.35 Besides the uniform prior of the state, we as-
sume a uniform distribution of noise over {, {	 | . Here it is crucial that the distribution 
of state and noise are common knowledge among agents. The actual state lies in a {-
surrounding around the idiosyncratic signal. Accordingly, any signal another agent } can re-
ceive is at most 2{ away from agents ’s signal, because all signals are included in a {-
surrounding around the actual state. Based on their signal, agents can decide on their action 1  )0,1*. In the incomplete information global game, with a unique prior on the signal’s pre-
cision, a switching strategy is based on a cut-off value ~   , where a rational player 
switches from action 0 to action 1: 
Y2|~  o1, 2 - ~0, 2 A ~V. 
Morris and Shin (1998) show, that this strategy survives the iterated elimination of strictly 
interim-dominated strategies. More importantly, there is one unique switching point ~% consti-
tuting a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The utility of action 1 weighted by the conditional prob-
ability of success must be equal to the utility of the safe action in equilibrium. The switching 
equilibrium has the unique cut-off value ~% above which rational agents attack and the unique 
state u% above which attacking is successful. 
In reality, however, information is often vague in a sense which is fundamentally different 
from pure risk. In fact, the real state of the world is often subject to ambiguity rather than to 
risk. Knight (1921) distinguishes risk as objectively known probabilities in contrast to ambi-
guity as unknown probability distributions. With the Ellsberg Paradox the response to am-
biguous situations or tasks has been experimentally tested and since then ambiguity aversion 
in simple lottery experiments is a well-established fact (Camerer and Weber, 1992; Ellsberg, 
1961; Maccheroni et al., 2006). From a theoretical perspective this is usually captured by 
                                                          
34
  The standard formulation of global games by Morris and Shin (2003) uses the weaker assumption that only 
the utility gain of choosing action 1 over action 0 is monotonically increasing. However, the above formula-
tion is necessary to incorporate multiple priors into the model, since agents can assess the actions with differ-
ent priors (Ui, 2009). 
35
  For ease of notation we omit the subscripts for individual players i.  
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models with multiple priors such as MaxMin Expected Utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) 
or Choquet Expected Utility (Schmeidler, 1989). In terms of global games with ambiguity an 
agent does not know the precision of his signal with certainty. Hence ambiguity can be incor-
porated into global games on the basis of MaxMin Expected Utility (MMEU) and assuming 
that agents minimise the expected utility over different conceivable distributions and then 
make decisions which maximise the corresponding utilities (Ui, 2009). Accordingly, each 
player has a set of conditional probability distributions Ξ with cardinality higher than one. We 
term this game as a global game with multiple priors and index the conditional posteriors Wu|2 by {  Ξ.  
4.2.3 Equilibrium Properties and Hypotheses 
The equilibrium structure can be depicted with the following two graphs. Here, the states u 
and u are the bounds of the state space for which rational choices are determined from the 
outset. In the first illustration one sees that between ~%  { and ~% N { the proportion of 
agents choosing the risky option is linearly increasing, due to the uniform distribution of the 
noise term. 
 
Figure 4.1: Optimal Cut-off Values and Equilibrium Structure 
In equilibrium the expected utility for the marginal agent from choosing action 0 between ~%  { and u%, and the expected utility from choosing action 1 between u% and ~% N { must 
be the same to pin down the unique switching state u%. This is illustrated by the two shaded 
areas in the second illustration above.  
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Next, we discuss the equilibrium properties under ambiguity instead of risk. Here agents do 
not know the precision of their signals. They only know that z~{, {	 is uniformly distrib-
uted with precision {  Ξ  {, { | . Hence { gives the highest precision of signals, as it 
induces the smallest support. Analogously, { implies the lowest precision of signals. As for 
the case of risk we have to limit the state space for ambiguity in order to avoid the spill over 
of signals. Hence, it must hold that: 
{ / { / l14 , u2 , 1  u2 . 
According to MMEU-preferences, we look for the cut-off value that minimises the chance of 
success for the speculative action. A higher cut-off will impair coordination and hence the 
maximum cut-off value ~%Ξ  maxΞ)~%{* minimises the expected utility of action 1. If 
only few people are required for a successful coordination, prospects for speculation are good 
and thus the minimal precision should be considered under ambiguity aversion. Conversely, if 
the chances for a successful coordination require many agents to coordinate, the maximum 
cut-off is determined by the maximum precision, as the prospects for speculating are already 
bad. 
Hypothesis 1: Players use undominated switching strategies under risk and ambiguity. 
Furthermore, recent experiments have shown that subjects’ behaviour exhibits excess aggres-
siveness regarding the individual cut-off points for switching from one strategy to the other, at 
least for risk (Fehr and Schurchkov, 2009; Heinemann et al., 2009). Following these results it 
is investigated whether this behaviour is consistent for global games under ambiguity. 
Hypothesis 2: Players are excessively aggressive under risk and ambiguity.  
Finally, we are particularly interested in the impact of varying both kinds of uncertainty. 
Hence the comparative statics are considered for the global game outlined so far. We deal 
with a single-prior game for risk and a multiple-prior global game for ambiguity; in both 
cases a theoretically unique prediction for the equilibrium can be derived.36 For the equilib-
rium under risk, u% decreases with the imprecision of the signal. If the hurdle function indi-
                                                          
36
  For details how the comparative statics are derived refer to the original results in Ui (2009). 
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cates a low critical mass in u%, then increasing imprecision of signals raises the equilibrium 
cut-off. Hence, the optimal cut-off value ~% decreases in the support of the noise and more 
coordination is facilitated.  
For ambiguity the set of conceivable supports of noise Ξ is enlarged (i.e. Ξ  Ξ ) and the 
proportion of agents to receive a signal above ~%y decreases. Therefore, the optimal cut-off 
value ~% increases in the support of the noise and reduces overall coordination.  
Hypothesis 3: Risk and ambiguity have opposite effects on coordination in a global game. 
The increase of risk and ambiguity respectively is implemented with the appropriate change 
of parameters in our experimental design. Based on the support of the noise term, in our set-
ting, for increasing risk the equilibrium cut-off values will decrease and hence more choice of 
the risky option and more coordination are expected. For increasing ambiguity, the cut-off 
values increase and hence less choice of the risky option and less coordination are expected.  
4.2.4 Related Experimental Literature 
There is already some literature which discusses the experimental investigation of global 
games. One main contribution is Heinemann et al. (2004) who investigated the difference 
between public and private information in the global games setting. They prove that subjects 
play switching strategies with undominated cut-off values, as the theory predicts. Also they 
control comparative static predictions and confirm that the estimated subjects’ thresholds in-
crease with the payoff of the safe action and the number of players. Anctil et al. (2010) con-
duct a first experiment analysing the role of increasing information quality in global games 
based on the creditor coordination game. However, their set-up allows for multiple equilibria, 
which impedes a test of comparative statics. More importantly, none of the previous global 
games experiments incorporate both risk and ambiguity. The first work focusing on this as-
pect is Kawagoe and Ui (2010). Overall, they find that increasing information quality in terms 
of reducing risk regarding the private signals results in more choices of the safe action. Thus 
they establish the comparative statics predictions for comparing two degrees of risk. More-
over, their ambiguity treatment shows more choices of the safe option than their risk treat-
ments. However, their experimental design compares one ambiguity and two risk treatments, 
so that they cannot test the comparative statics predictions for ambiguity, as pinpointed in this 
chapter. Another distinction is that for the one ambiguity treatment, they only consider two 
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conceivable supports, whereas we use different sets of supports of the ambiguous noise term 
making the decision situation more complex and more realistic.   
4.3 Experimental Design 
The focus of our experimental investigations is directly derived from the theoretical consid-
erations which yield different predictions for the unique equilibrium under risk and ambigu-
ity. Accordingly, we need two treatments to vary the kind of informational uncertainty. More-
over, we are interested in the comparative statics for changing the degrees of risk respectively 
ambiguity. Overall, we have a 2 x 2 design with the four treatments low risk (LR), high risk 
(HR), low ambiguity (LA) and high ambiguity (HA). 
The experiment itself followed the standard protocol of most global games experiments based 
on the speculative attack game (Cabrales et al., 2007; Cornad, 2006; Heinemann et al., 
2004).37 Subjects had a list of ten different signal numbers and correspondingly ten independ-
ent decisions to make between a safe action A and a risky action B for every round.38 The de-
cisions were displayed in random order to avoid any order effects in the application of switch-
ing strategies. Every experiment lasted for 15 rounds, giving us 150 decisions per subject. The 
state space was drawn from a uniform distribution between 20 and 180, the values 0 to 20 and 
180 to 200 were not considered in order to avoid a spill over to the state space, given our 
parameterisation.  
The only difference between the risk and ambiguity treatments is the information provided to 
the experimental subjects. While in the risk treatments subjects knew the exact precision of 
their signal, this information was not given in the ambiguity treatments. Here subjects only 
got the information that the actual precision (the support of the noise term) was contained in a 
given closed interval. Accordingly, in the risk treatments it was common knowledge that the 
signals were either within 10 or 16 around the true state. In the ambiguity treatment it was 
known that the precision of the signal was either between 8 and 16 in the low ambiguity 
treatment or between 3 and 19 in the high ambiguity treatment. All integer values in between 
                                                          
37
   For the full experimental instructions refer to the appendix.    
38
  Please note that the action 0 from the theory part is denoted as A for the experiment. Accordingly, action 1 
from the theory is denoted as action B.  
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were possible. Both intervals were deliberately chosen so that the average which might be 
taken as a focal point was not the actual value of the signal precision.  
Treatment Set of conceivable precisions 
Actual 
Precision 
Subjects knew that  was 
contained in... 
Low Risk (LR) {  )10* 10 2  10, 2 N 10	 
High Risk (HR) {  )16* 16 2  16, 2 N 16	 
Low Ambiguity (LA) {  8, 16	 10 2  {, 2 N {	 
High Ambiguity (HA) {  3, 19	 16 2  {, 2 N {	 
Table 4.1: Parameterisation of Noise Term across Treatments 
In global games experiments there is no standard group size. However, it is imperative to have 
more than two players in one group, because with only two players the global games solution 
does not differ from a risk dominant solution. For our experiment, we chose groups of six 
players. To reach our objective of analysing both the difference in risk and ambiguity, which 
theory directly predicts and the difference in varying degrees of risk and ambiguity, which 
theory addresses with comparative statics, we chose a between-subjects design. This departs 
from much of the existing experimental literature on global games, which implement within-
subject designs. However, for our purpose it is eminent to have different subjects play the 
different parameter settings. Finally, we deliberately omit the provision of feedback between 
single rounds, which is sometimes found in related experiments. This is crucial for our ex-
perimental design to prevent the dissolution of ambiguity due to resampling.  
The experimental sessions were conducted in February 2010 at the University of Cologne 
Laboratory for Economics Research (CLER). The experiment was implemented using z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007) and the subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). In total we 
had 120 subjects participating in the experiments, most of them with a background in eco-
nomics or business administration. Subjects were matched in groups of six players and the 
matching remained constant over the course of the experiment. Every subject received a 
show-up fee of 2.50 € and the average pay-off was 16.97 € with sessions lasting about 1 hour 
and 20 minutes.  
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4.4 Experimental Analysis and Results 
4.4.1 Undominated Switching Strategies 
The theory of global games implies that subjects employ switching strategies, i.e. that they 
choose the safe action for low states and the speculative action for high states with one cut-off 
value where they switch their strategy. A strategy is dominated whenever the subject opts for 
an action although he knows that the other action yields a higher payoff with certainty. In our 
setting the dominant strategy is to choose the risky speculative action B, if 2 - u N { or to 
choose the safe action, if 2 / u  {. The usage of switching strategies is well established by 
previous experiments on global games (Duffy and Ochs, 2009; Heinemann et al., 2004). We 
extend this finding into decision situations with risk and ambiguity.  
Treatment Usage of undominated switch-ing strategies 
Low Risk (LR) 98.89% 
High Risk (HR) 98.44% 
Low Ambiguity (LA) 96.75% 
High Ambiguity (HA) 97.53% 
Table 4.2: Equilibrium Cut-offs and Individual Estimates 
Here 97.07% of the strategies in the risk treatments and 98.64% of strategies in the ambiguity 
treatments are consistent with such undominated switching strategies.39 The frequencies with 
which these strategies are played do not differ significantly between treatments.40 
4.4.2 Excess Aggressiveness and Best Response Behaviour  
Based on the fact that most subjects employ switching strategies, we analyse whether these 
are based on unique cut-off points, i.e. the equilibrium prediction of the global game solution. 
Overall, only 30% of players under ambiguity and only 23% of the players under risk have a 
unique cut-off point. Regarding our aim of comparing subjects’ behaviour and equilibrium 
                                                          
39
  For the ambiguity treatments, this is an overall average over both respective extremes of conceivable preci-
sions. 
40
  Using the Mann-Whitney Test, independent of the assumed interval of the support we find in the ambiguity 
treatments for the smallest possible support p = 0.86 and for the highest possible support p = 0.49. Further-
more, there is no significant difference between the risk treatments. 
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predictions, that imposes the problem that overall only 27% of the subjects always behave 
consistently with a unique cut-off. We proceed in the following by estimating cut-off values 
for all players.41 Then we compare the estimated individual cut-offs with the equilibrium cut-
offs for all treatments.42 We find that the estimated individual cut-offs (~̂) are significantly 
smaller than the equilibrium predictions.43 Hence, subjects are overly aggressive in their 
choices of the risky action as stated in hypothesis 2.44  
Treatment Precision %  min  max   (between) 
LR {  10 89.1 72.14 42.78 105.0 17.32 
HR {  16 87.1 72.11 25.06 122.13 17.74 
LA {  8 89.7 
71.47 33.75 140.69 22.94 
 {  16 87.1 
HA {  3 91.2 
71.64 40.0 114.35 18.74 
 {  19 86.0 
Table 4.3: Equilibrium Cut-offs and Individual Estimates 
In case of the ambiguity treatments this holds for any precision of the signal the subjects 
might have assumed in the given range. The actual mean cut-off points, as observed in our 
data set for those players having a unique cut-off, are all significantly lower than the equilib-
rium predictions.45 This is consistent with the data from Kawagoe and Ui (2010).  
To further analyse excess aggressiveness, we compare the aggregate mass of players choosing 
the risky action B with the equilibrium prediction for all possible signals. This gives us six 
graphical depictions for all treatments (see figure 4.2). The red lines represent the experimen-
tal data and the blue line the predicted equilibrium play. This behaviour illustrates that sub-
jects play more aggressively than predicted by the theory, as many switch for private signals 
                                                          
41
  We estimate individual cut-offs via logistic regression. Since subjects with unique cut-offs exhibit complete 
data separation we test for robustness of the estimates via the penalised maximum likelihood estimation 
(MLE) proposed by Firth (1993). However, the difference between ordinary MLE and penalised MLE esti-
mation is only 0.23 units on average. 
42
  In the ambiguity treatments we calculate the equilibrium cut-offs for the minimum and maximum support of 
     the noise term for both these treatments. 
43
  Two sided t-test: p-value < 0.01. 
44
  Estimated values are indicated by y ̂ and mean values by y. 
45
  Two sided t-test: p-value < 0.01. 
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lower than the optimal theoretical cut-off. The robustness of our results regarding excess ag-
gressiveness and the similar finding by Kawagoe and Ui (2010) suggests that this kind of be-
haviour is independent of the functional form of uncertainty. However, according to the defi-
nition of a best response in global games, the behaviour of economic agents depends essen-
tially on their beliefs about other players’ beliefs, i.e. higher order beliefs (Fehr and 
Schurchkov, 2009; Morris and Shin, 2003). 
 
Figure 4.2: Aggregate Mass of Players choosing the risky action B 
Hence, given that subjects have overly aggressive or optimistic beliefs about the other players, 
i.e. judging the common cut-off values smaller than the theoretical optimum in equilibrium, 
the results of excess aggressiveness can still be rationalised.  
To test this hypothesis we employ two related measures for best response behaviour. First, we 
use the averages of estimated individual cut-offs (~̂) and calculate the best responses on this 
LR ({  10) HR ({  16 
LA ({  8 LA ({  16 
HA ({  3) HA ({  19 
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basis "T, given a linear utility function for every subject. This is done for every treatment 
by:  
  ? u>u  
TH% . 
Secondly, we determine the highest state up to which coordination always failed and the low-
est state from which onwards coordination was always successful. The centre of this interval 
serves as our measure for the threshold of a group. We then take the estimated group thresh-
olds (u) from our data set and compute the best responses on this basis "T  for every group: 
  ? u>u  
Tm . 
This allows us to classify the strategies played in our experiment as best responses across all 
four treatments and yields the following results. 
 Mean share of best responses Standard deviation 
Treatment     
Low Risk 92.38 % 92.58 % 0.0509 0.0440 
High Risk 90.47 % 90.76 % 0.0703 0.0623 
Low Ambiguity 89.27 % 90.33 % 0.0966 0.0923 
High Ambiguity 89.49 % 89.44 % 0.0623 0.0616 
Table 4.4: Mean Share of Best Responses 
Both measures exhibit evidence for our hypothesis, showing that across all treatments about 
90% of all decisions can be classified as rational based on a simple best response model with 
overly optimistic beliefs. Therefore overly optimistic beliefs in the speculative attack game, 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
4.4.3 Opposite Effects of Risk and Ambiguity  
Regarding the comparison of risk and ambiguity in global games, we set out from a theoreti-
cal result derived by Ui (2009). Accordingly, an increase of risk should lower the cut-off 
points, whereas an increase of ambiguity should raise the cut-off points. Hence, determining 
the equilibrium behaviour for these two kinds of uncertainty, risk should theoretically im-
prove coordination in global games and ambiguity should diminish it. Regarding risk, the ex-
periment of Kawagoe and Ui (2010) found that decreasing risk, i.e. providing a more precise 
signal, increases the relative frequency of safe actions. However, for their results they did not 
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provide statistical tests on the differences of the individual cut-offs, but employ logistic re-
gressions on individual choices. We in fact focus on the individual cut-offs as a more funda-
mental and robust representation of individual behaviour in our speculative attack game. The 
following figure shows the estimated individual cut-offs across all four treatments: 
  
Figure 4.3: Estimated Individual Cut-off Values (Boxplot) 
For both risk and ambiguity the two graphs are much alike. We can infer that there is no sig-
nificant difference for either variation.46 First, regarding risk this means that the results from 
Kawagoe and Ui (2010) are not robust, when comparing the distributions of individual cut-
offs. Secondly, the distributions of cut-offs show that the predictions of the comparative stat-
ics do not hold for either kind of uncertainty. When increasing the degree of risk respectively 
ambiguity, theory predicts an increase respectively decrease of cut-offs for the individual 
switching strategies. We initially find no evidence for these opposite effects in our data. How-
ever, this might be due to the high variance of individual cut-offs as already discussed by the 
figure above.  
                                                          
46
  Comparing LA and HA the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test has p = 0.958, for LR and HR the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test yields p = 0.594. 
~̂ 
~̂ 
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Hence, we additionally analyse individual behaviour based on logistic regressions with ran-
dom effects. In doing so, we can directly estimate individual probabilities to choose the risky 
action B in our experiment, whilst controlling for several variables. The most central inde-
pendent variables directly corresponding with our design are the Signal 2 subjects receive and 
a dummy variable for the high risk treatment HR respectively the high ambiguity treatment 
HA. Accordingly, the low risk and ambiguity treatments serve as the baseline. Furthermore, 
Sex is a standard control variable we elicited from the additional questionnaire. Then Round 
controls for time effects in the course of the experiment, whereas 1st Round only controls for 
a difference in behaviour in the very first round, where subjects might still adapt to the ex-
perimental set-up. Finally, the dummy Unique ~ flags all subjects which made their choices 
based on a unique cut-off value for all rounds of the experiment. Similarly, Never Dom is a 
dummy variable for subjects who never played dominated switching strategies. For the ambi-
guity treatments this is computed, given the highest conceivable support. Based on these vari-
ables, four models are tested in terms of the choice of the action.  
According to the theoretical prediction increasing risk from the low risk to the high risk 
treatment should increase the probability to choose the speculative action B.  
Dependent Variable: choice between action A and B 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 
 
-11.988*** 
(0.311) 
-11.701*** 
(0.437) 
-10.637*** 
(0.450) 
-10.689*** 
(0.453) 
Signal x 
 
0.163*** 
(0.004) 
0.163*** 
(0.004) 
0.166*** 
(0.004) 
0.167*** 
(0.004) 
HR 
 
-0.081 
(0.255) 
-0.084 
(0.269) 
-0.019 
(0.267) 
0.0378 
(0.277) 
Sex 
 
 -0.212 
(0.303) 
0.016 
(0.286) 
-0.017 
(0.294) 
1st Round 
 
 0.304 
(0.256) 
0.304 
(0.258) 
0.306 
(0.259) 
Round 
 
 -0.023 
(0.014) 
-0.024 
(0.014) 
-0.024 
(0.015) 
Never Dom 
 
  -1.795*** 
(0.339) 
-1.998*** 
(0.354) 
Unique ~ 
 
   0.730** 
(0.332)  2.547 2.551 2.543 2.529  0.664 0.664 0.663 0.660 
Wald F² 2219.52 2216.86 2191.65 2177.61  - F² 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N observations 9000 9000 9000 9000 
n clusters 60 60 60 60 
Table 4.5: Logistic Regression for Risk Treatments (Random Effects) 
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As a first result it is confirmed that the signal 2 always has a significant effect on the proba-
bility of choosing action B rather than A (see table 4.4). Also we find significant effects for 
the variables Never Dom and Unique ~. Thus in the risk treatments subjects who never played 
dominated switching strategies are less likely to choose the risky action B. Conversely, all 
subjects with a unique cut-off point are more likely to choose the risky action based on our 
experimental data. Further, all four models indicate that, there is virtually no effect for in-
creasing risk, when considering the HR dummy variable with the low risk treatment as a base-
line. This contrasts the theoretical predictions as well as the initial findings on risk in global 
games from Kawagoe and Ui (2010).  
Applying the same regression techniques to ambiguity (see table 4.5), we even find significant 
evidence against the initial theoretical prediction, i.e. with increasing ambiguity, as indicated 
by the HA dummy variable, the individual probability to choose the speculative action B in-
creases significantly.  
Dependent Variable: choice between action A and B 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -8.971*** 
(0.223) 
-9.886*** 
(0.283) 
-11.036*** 
(0.438) 
-11.034*** 
(0.442) 
Signal x 0.118*** 
(0.002) 
0.120*** 
(0.002) 
0.122*** 
(0.003) 
0.122*** 
(0.003) 
HA 0.279 
(0.239) 
0.416* 
(0.220) 
0.542** 
(0.262) 
0.538*** 
(0.262) 
Sex  1.121*** 
(0.217) 
0.967*** 
(0.243) 
0.932*** 
(0.252) 
1st Round  0.590** 
(0.250) 
0.596** 
(0.252) 
0.596** 
(0.252) 
Round  0.010 
(0.013) 
0.010 
(0.428) 
0.010 
(0.013) 
Never Dom 
 
  1.243*** 
(0.360) 
1.184*** 
(0.368) 
Unique ~    0.255 
(0.314)  2.276 2.297 2.274 2.277  0.612 0.616 0.611 0.612 
Wald F² 2483.64 2558.80 2432.87 2420.57  - F² 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N observations 9000 9000 9000 9000 
n clusters 60 60 60 60 
Table 4.6: Logistic Regression for Ambiguity Treatments (Random Effects) 
This finding entails that in our experiment subjects behaved in an ambiguity affine manner, 
because for this kind of uncertainty the comparative static effect depended directly on the 
assumption of ambiguity aversion. Furthermore, ambiguity affinity is in some way consistent 
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with the robust observation of excess aggressiveness in experimental global games. If subjects 
are overly aggressive or believe others to be overly aggressive and hence the common cut-off 
to be significantly lower, ambiguity loving behaviour further amplifies the choice of the 
speculative action for smaller signals. Considering the other significant effects in the regres-
sion, we find again that the signal is highly significant for predicting the choice between ac-
tions A and B, as already found in the risk treatments. More interestingly, we find a strong 
gender effect where males are more likely to choose the risky action B under ambiguity.  
The actual round of the game is not relevant for the decision in both the risk and the ambigu-
ity set-up. However, for risk we assert a strong effect of the first round on decision outcomes. 
Finally, we also find that under risk the subjects never using dominated switching strategies 
are also more frequently choosing action B. As for the analysis of cut-offs, the regression of 
individual probabilities to choose the risky action, does not support the theoretical predictions 
taken from Ui (2009).  
4.5 Conclusions 
In this paper we have investigated the effects of risk and ambiguity in global games. Even 
though theory predicts an opposite effect on coordination for these two different kinds of un-
certainty, we do not find this effect in the experimental data.  
First, we corroborated a central result from related experiment on global games, showing that 
subjects almost always (98%) employ switching strategies. However, the cut-offs they use for 
this strategies are only rarely unique, i.e. only for 27% of the players. Theory predicts a 
unique equilibrium of cut-offs for any given parameterisation of the global game. However, 
when estimating the cut-off values for each subject our experimental data revealed a high 
variance. Secondly, we also detected excess aggressiveness in subjects’ behaviour, which is 
consistent with many other experiments on global games. Further, we demonstrated that the 
excess aggressiveness we find can be explained as a best response strategy based on the belief 
that other subjects behave overly optimistically. This is also supported by our data on the es-
timated individual cut-off values which are below the equilibrium predictions.  
Finally, we tested the predictions of a theoretical model differentiating risk and ambiguity 
with respect to signal precision. This theory estimated that an increase in risk from our low to 
high risk treatment would result in lower individual cut-offs, more play of the speculative 
action and thus more coordination. In contrast, for an increase from the low to high ambiguity 
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treatment, it predicts the opposite effect of higher individual cut-offs, less play of the specula-
tive action and thus less coordination. Although a previous experiment by Kawagoe and Ui 
(2010) gave first evidence for the effect regarding risk, we could not confirm the theory in 
both regards. Regarding the estimated cut-offs between treatments we do not find a significant 
difference. A further analysis of individual probabilities with a logistic regression even sug-
gests that if there are effects for the comparative statics, they might be diametrically opposed 
to the theoretical predictions. This means that subjects in this sort of game are eventually am-
biguity affine. With regard to this final result, further work is necessary to elicit why subjects 
exhibit both excess aggressive and ambiguity affine behaviour in this kind of coordination 
game.  
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4.6 Appendix 
The instructions have been the same across all treatments. We only changed the paragraph 
about what subjects know about the precision of their signal. The following version is trans-
lated from German and the according different paragraphs are exemplary given for the LR 
and LA treatment as the HR and HA treatments were modified accordingly. 
Instructions 
Welcome and thank you for participating in today’s experiment! Please read the following 
instructions carefully; they are identical for all participants. Please do not communicate from 
now on. If you have any question, raise your hand and we will come to your place and help 
you. Furthermore, please switch off your mobile phone. Violating these rules can result in an 
exclusion from this experiment.  
You can earn money in this experiment. The amount depends on your decisions as well as on 
the decisions of the other participants. At the end of the experiment, you individually receive 
your payoff in cash. Your payoff consists of a show-up fee of 2.50 EUR plus the sum of pay-
offs of the single rounds. In the experiment, the currency “ECU” (Experimental Currency 
Unit) will be used for your payoff. 1000 ECU equal one EUR (1000 ECU = 1 EUR).  
At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly matched with 5 other participants. 
You will never know who these participants are. You will interact with these participants for 
the whole course of the experiment as a group of 6 people; the composition of your group 
does not change. In total, the experiment consists of 15 payoff-relevant rounds with 10 indi-
vidual decisions each. In each decision you have the choice between two options A and B. 
Before the first round, you will have to answer 8 comprehension questions at the computer. 
Course of a round 
There are totally 10 decisions between options A and B in each round. Your payoffs depend 
on your decision as well as on a number Y which is unknown to you. You will just receive a 
more or less precise hint about Y. Before we present you the decision options, we will begin 
with a characterization of the unknown number Y and the according hint. 
• The computer randomly chooses an integer Y which lies between 20 and 180, i.e. Y 
can take the values 20, 21, 22, . . . 179 and 180. Each number is equally probable. 
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• For each decision, the computer chooses a new Y. [Information given in the LR treat-
ment with {  10] 
• The number Y is identical for every participant, but is not told to anybody. Instead, 
every Participant will receive a hint about Y.  
All hints are integers and lie between Y – 10 and Y + 10. Every number between Y – 
10 and Y + 10 is equally probable. For example, if you receive the number 80 as your 
hint, you know that Y lies between 80 – 10 and 80 + 10. And every number between 
80 – 10 and 80 + 10 is equally probable. [Information given in the LA treatment with {  8,16	] 
• The number Y is identical for every participant, but is not told to anybody. Instead, 
every participant will receive a hint about Y. All hints are integers and lie between Y – 
e and Y + e. Every number between Y – e and Y + e is equally probable. For exam-
ple, if you receive the number 80 as your hint, you know that Y lies between 80 – e 
and 80 + e. And every number between 80 – e and 80 + e is equally probable. No par-
ticipant knows the value of the number e, but all know that e lies somewhere between 
8 and 16. How probable the single values of e are is not known by anybody. This 
means that you do not know how precise the hint number informs you about Y. Every 
participant only knows his own hint number. One’s own hint number is drawn inde-
pendently of the hint numbers of the other participants according to a random process. 
Hence your own hint number usually differs from the hint numbers of the other par-
ticipants in your group. 
Based on your hint number you now decide between the options A and B: 
• If you decide for option A, you receive 40 ECU. The value for option A is always the 
same. 
• If you decide for option B, you can reach a payoff of Y. However, this depends on 
how many of the other participants in your group have also chosen B in this decision. 
Option B is the more probable to yield a payoff of Y the more participants choose B. 
Furthermore: the higher the unknown number Y, the less participants are needed for 
option B to yield a payoff. The following table shows how many players are required 
- 67 - 
given a certain value of Y for option B to yield a payoff of Y. (Every participant also 
gets this table on a separate sheet.) 
If the unkown number Y lies within the fol-
lowing interval: 
…then the minimum number of participants 
(including yourself), who have to choose op-
tion B for this to yield a payoff of Y is: 
40 bis 59 6 
60 bis 79 5 
80 bis 99 4 
100 bis 119 3 
120 bis 139 2 
140 bis 180 1 
 
In order to determine the required number of participants for success of option B, the table is 
based on the formula: 8   =. This means that for, e.g. Y = 76 a minimum of 8   =  8  =  4.2, i.e. 5 or more participants in your group have to choose option B for this to yield a 
payoff of Y = 76 ECU. The minimum number of participants is always rounded up and there 
is always at least 1 participant required.  
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Sample Screen for the decisions: 
 
• After you have made your 10 decisions, please click on „Submit“ to send your list. 
• When all participants have submitted their 10 decisions, the round is over. Subse-
quently, a new round begins. 
 
Exemplary calculation of payoffs 
Example 1: 
Suppose in this example the unknown Y = 81 has been chosen by the computer. [Remember: 
no participant knows the true value of Y, you always just receive a hint number]. According 
to the table, for Y = 81 there have to be at least 4 participants (or more) choosing option B for 
this to yield a payoff of Y = 81 ECU. Suppose, for example, 2 participants choose option A 
and 4 participants choose option B. Those 2 participants who have chosen option A each re-
ceive 40 ECU. Since 4 participants have chosen B, option B yields a payoff of Y ECU. There-
fore, each of those 4 participants is credited Y = 81 ECU. 
Example 2: 
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Suppose in this example the unknown Y = 81 has been chosen by the computer. [Remember: 
no participant knows the true value of Y, you always just receive a hint number]. According 
to the table, for Y = 81 there have to be at least 4 participants (or more) choosing option B for 
this to yield a payoff of Y = 81 ECU. Suppose, for example, 4 participants choose option A 
and 2 participants choose option B. Those 4 participants who have chosen option A each re-
ceive 40 ECU. Since 2 participants have chosen B, this option does not yet yield a success at 
Y = 81. Therefore, those 2 participants who have chosen option B receive 0 ECU for this de-
cision. After all 15 rounds have been played, the payoffs of all decisions of all rounds will get 
summed up to a final payoff. In addition to your final payoff you will get the show-up fee of 
2.50 EUR. 
Questionnaire 
At the end of the experiment, we will hand out a short questionnaire. The stated data therein, 
along with all other collected data, will be made anonymous. We would like to ask you to fill 
out the questionnaire. 
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5 Disclosing Conflicts of Interest 
5.1 Introduction 
Information and its reliability and completeness are central elements in economic decision 
making.47 However, people frequently lack full information or decisions have to be made on 
the ground of asymmetric information as in principal-agent conflicts (Benabou and Laroque, 
1992; Inderst and Ottaviani, 2009). This is especially the case whenever a decision maker 
does not have the necessary expertise, as for example a patient compared to his doctor or an 
individual investor compared to his financial advisor. Thus in many economic and social 
situations, people obtain advice from professional experts who are better informed or more 
proficient. However, when the interests of an advisor and a client are not perfectly aligned, a 
conflict of interest shapes their relationship. This is a major impediment to perfect informa-
tion transmission and the realisation of efficient outcomes. 
Our investigations address this general problem of information transmission. The conclusions 
drawn here can then be transferred to application such as conflicts of interest for financial 
advice. In this realm financial advisors are usually incentivised differently for different prod-
ucts; this prevents them from making optimal decisions for their customers. Moreover, in 
such a scenario customers might not be aware of conflicts of interest, which affects the strate-
gic responses to their received advice. Sender-receiver games can be used to model conflicts 
of interest and their disclosure. In essence, disclosure is meant to prevent the advisor from 
giving biased advices. Accordingly, legislators, regulators and many academics regard man-
datory disclosure of conflicts of interests as the best policy advice. Since November 2007 the 
European Union’s “Markets in Financial Instruments Directive” (MiFID) is enacted, which 
requires the disclosure of commissions for the sale of financial products to retail customers.  
With our experiment we investigate the effects of transparency, when disclosing conflicts of 
interest. We use a cheap-talk sender-receiver game, in which only a sender, i.e. an advisor, 
has private information about a true state of the world and then transmits a message about the 
state to a receiver, i.e. a decision maker (Cai and Wang, 2006; Crawford and Sobel, 1982; 
                                                          
47
  This chapter is joint work with Axel Ockenfels and Roman Inderst. 
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Sanchez-Pages and Vorsatz, 2007). By means of three different treatments, we analyse the 
effects of different degrees of transparency about conflicts of interest on subjects’ behaviour. 
We find that disclosing the conflict of interest matters as it diminishes the informativeness of 
the game. Nevertheless, sender behaviour is characterised by overcommunication and receiv-
ers are discounting biased advice insufficiently.  
The remainder of this chapter unfolds as following: section 2 presents some related literature 
and the basic game theoretical structure as the basis for our experimental study. Section 3 
describes our experimental design and procedures. Then section 4 presents and analyses the 
main results. Section 5 gives a short discussion and finally the last section concludes the find-
ings and gives an outlook on further extensions of our experiment.  
5.2 Related Literature and Hypotheses 
5.2.1 Related Literature 
In this section we give a short overview of the related experimental literature on information 
transmission games as well as on disclosing conflicts of interest. 
The first experimental investigation of Crawford and Sobel’s information transmission game 
was conducted by Dickhaut et al. (1995). It has corroborated the theoretical predictions, and 
in particular proven that increasing the bias b, leads to senders gradually transmitting less in-
formation.48 However, transmitting less information is still different from the equilibrium 
prediction of not transmitting any information; hence, an “overcommunication effect” is 
found. This effect was also confirmed by Cai and Wang (2006) for a similar strategic infor-
mation transmission game. Here again senders reveal more private information as well as re-
ceivers trust senders’ messages more, than predicted by the most informative equilibrium.49  
Coming to the second point at hand, there is yet little literature specifically devoted to study-
ing disclosure in information transmission games. Disclosing conflicts of interest was first 
experimentally assessed by Cain et al. (2005). There experiment was based on a principal-
agent model, where the agents had financial incentives to exaggerate their advice. This con-
                                                          
48
  For a survey on experiments regarding information transmission and cheap talk confer to Crawford (1998). 
49
  Other recent experimental studies of information transmission games can be found in Wang et al. (2010) and 
Sanchez-Pages and Vorsatz (2007). 
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flict of interest was disclosed in one treatment but undisclosed in the other. However, in the 
disclosed conflicts of interest treatment, principals were not able to sufficiently discount the 
agents’ reports. The agents did also not achieve higher payments in the undisclosed treatment 
as one would expect. These results are a first indication that increasing transparency does not 
necessarily increase efficiency under conflicts of interest. Koch and Schmidt (2010) replicate 
these main results in a different experimental setting. Another recent study of de Meza et al. 
(2007) on behalf of the Financial Service Authority (FSA) in the United Kingdom also 
showed only small evidence that mandatory information disclosure matters. 
5.2.2 Theoretical Predictions and Hypotheses 
We base our investigations on a simple information-transmission game, where a sender and a 
receiver are interacting. Generally, in this class of games the sender has better or more reliable 
information, but the receiver has to take a decision which determines the payoff for both play-
ers. Thus we have a dynamic game with incomplete information, which structure is as fol-
lows:  
1. Nature draws a state si from a set of possible states S = {s1,…,sI} according to a prob-
ability distribution p(si), where p(si) > 0 for every i and p(s1) + …+ p(si) = 1.   
2. Only the sender observes si and chooses a message mj from a set of possible messages 
M = {m1,…,mJ} to send to the receiver.   
3. The receiver only observes mj but not si and then chooses an action ak from a set of 
possible actions A = {a1,…,aK}. 
4. Sender and receiver payoff functions are given by US = (si, ak) and UR = (si, ak), re-
spectively.   
In this paper we follow the model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) which specifies the follow-
ing utility functions US for the sender and UR for the receiver: 
Y, 1  1  Y N 	  
Y, 1  1  Y  
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This continues the basic setup and introduces the central parameter b, which constitutes the 
conflict of interest in the sender’s utility function. In this game sender strategies can be either 
pooling or separating.50 The equilibrium analysis yields, that there are no fully separating 
equilibria but only partial pooling equilibria (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). Therefore, unless 
the sender’s and receiver’s interests are identical, the cheap-talk game with a conflict of inter-
est has no equilibrium in which the sender accurately reports the true state of the world, ex-
cept for incidentally telling the truth. Hence, if the conflict of interest becomes transparent 
there should be no communication in this game. 
We examine the correlation between the true states of the world and the messages sent 
(henceforth CorrSM) to measure the informativeness of a sender’s message. How trusting a 
receiver is can be measured by the correlation between the message he receives and the action 
he takes (henceforth CorrMA). Finally, the informativeness of the entire process of informa-
tion transmission can be quantified by the correlation between final actions and the initial true 
states of the world (henceforth CorrSA).  
Concerning our disclosed treatment (T3), if there is no conflict of interest, i.e. b=0, perfect 
communication is possible in the game. Here the separating and completely informative equi-
librium would commence as most informative equilibrium. In this case all correlations would 
be 1, meaning that a sender always tells the truth for every possible state of the world and the 
receiver always decides to take the action according to the sender’s message. As the conflict 
of interest exists, no information can be transmitted between the sender and receiver. Here the 
babbling equilibrium would occur as most informative equilibrium, in which the sender pools 
for the states 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 and the receiver always chooses action 3, no matter what mes-
sage he receives. Thus, the theoretical prediction for the disclosed treatment would expect all 
above mentioned correlations CorrSM, CorrMA and CorrSA to be 0. 
For the intransparent treatment (T1) and semi-transparent treatment (T2) the theoretical pre-
diction is that for b=0, we should also observe: CorrSM=CorrMA=CorrSA=1. Moreover, for 
b=2 we should find CorrMA=CorrSA=1, but CorrSM=0 in the intransparent treatment. And 
                                                          
50
  The pooling strategy is characterised by sending the same message independent from the state drawn by 
nature. The separating strategy on the other hand means sending different messages depending on the drawn 
state. So both pooling and separating equilibria are possible in this game. In the basic model the value of b is 
common knowledge. 
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for b=2 in the semi-transparent treatment we expect CorrSM=CorrMA=CorrSA=0, as the 
players know about the possibility of the conflict of interest and thus cannot trust each other. 
Based on the theoretical predictions we derive two basic hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: As the conflict of interest occurs, less information is transmitted by a sender 
(CorrSM) and less is utilised by a receiver (CorrMA) across all treatments. 
Hypothesis 2: Considering the conflict of interest under the different transparency conditions, 
we expect that the informativeness (CorrSA) gradually decreases when increasing the degree 
of transparency. Especially, in the disclosed treatment there should be no exchange of infor-
mation.  
Regarding the adaption of behaviour we make two further hypotheses, one for the sender and 
one for the receiver.  
Hypothesis 3: When conflicts of interest are disclosed, a sender feels more morally licensed to 
distort the truth. Therefore disclosure causes a crowding out effect on senders’ moral costs of 
lying and his feelings of guilt.  
Hypothesis 4: When conflicts of interest are disclosed, a receiver is rationally less credulous 
and thus discounts the received messages more. So we expect receivers to increase their dis-
counting of messages with increasing transparency.   
5.3 Experimental Design and Procedures 
Based on the existing experimental literature, there is still no consistent theory explaining the 
interplay of information transmission and disclosing conflicts of interest. Therefore we devise 
a new experimental design to study the effects when increasing transparency levels. For three 
different transparency levels we observe the behaviour of a potentially biased advisor and that 
of his client. 
In our experiment, subjects are paired to play the following game of strategic information 
transmission: One player always acts as a sender, e.g. as an advisor, and the other as a re-
ceiver, e.g. as a client or investor. These roles are kept constant with a partners matching 
throughout the experiment in order to facilitate learning and reputation building. Senders are 
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neutrally called “participants A” and receivers are called “participants B” in our instructions.51 
At the beginning of each round, the sender is informed about the “true state of the world”, 
which is a number s uniformly drawn from the state space S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} that is referred to 
as “random number”. The receiver is not informed about the random number, but about the 
distribution of S. The sender then sends a message m to the receiver from the set of messages 
M = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. After receiving the message from the sender, the receiver decides on an 
action a from the action space A = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The true state of the world and the re-
ceiver’s action then determine both players’ payoffs according to the following formulas:   
Sender: 4.110110 absS −+−=Π  
Receiver: 4.110110 asR −−=Π     
The exponent of 1.4 is chosen to make payoffs more sensitive to the choices subjects make.52 
Additionally, the sender is subject to a bias b, which is uniformly drawn from the bias space 
B = {0, 2} that indicates a possible conflict of interest between the sender and the receiver. If 
b=0, players’ interests are perfectly aligned, if b=2, they are not perfectly aligned. Hence, the 
receiver achieves the highest income if his action matches the true state, while the sender’s 
payoff peaks when the receiver chooses the true state of the world plus b. The payoffs are 
assigned in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 
We then run three treatments with the distinctive feature of different degrees of transparency 
about the sender’s conflict of interest. In all treatments the sender is informed about the reali-
sation of the true state of the world and about his bias at the beginning of each period. Addi-
tionally, he is endowed with information about his and the receiver’s actions and payoffs after 
each round. By contrast, the receiver is never informed about the realisation of the true state at 
the beginning of each period. The three treatments vary in the provision of information about 
the sender’s bias for the receiver at the beginning of each period. Treatment 1 (T1) is called 
“intransparent”, because the receiver does not know if the sender is subject to a conflict of 
interest. He is just equipped with feedback about his payoff at the end of each round. Treat-
ment 2 (T2) is called “semi-transparent”, because the receiver is informed that the probabil-
                                                          
51
   For the full experimental instructions refer to the appendix.    
52
  These payoff functions are similar to those of Wang et al. (2010). 
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ity of b=2 is 50%. Additionally, he receives feedback not only about his payoff but also about 
the true state of the world and the sender’s payoff after each period. Finally, treatment 3 (T3) 
implements the “disclosed” setting, i.e. at the beginning of each round both sender and re-
ceiver are informed about the realisation of the bias.  
The experimental sessions took place in February 2009 at the Cologne Laboratory for Eco-
nomic Research (CLER). The subjects were seated randomly and there was no opportunity for 
communication. The instructions explained all possible actions and payoffs of senders and 
receivers so that payoffs could be looked up in a table instead of being calculated. Moreover, 
in order to ensure that every participant understood the game-structure we conducted a short 
quiz before the start of the experiment, which was filled out correctly by all participants. 
Overall, 96 subjects participated. About 50% of the participants were studying economics or 
business administration; the other half came from other fields of academic studies. All sub-
jects received a guaranteed show-up fee of 2.50 Euro and on average the participants earned 
14.40 Euro with sessions lasting for approximately 1.5 hours. For the recruitment we used the 
online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) and the experiment itself was programmed 
with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). At the end of each session and before the payment, partici-
pants were requested to fill out a questionnaire asking for their beliefs about the average deci-
sions of the other participants and for basic demographic information.  
5.4 Results and Discussion 
5.4.1 Main Experimental Results 
For assessing our two first hypotheses we consider the effect of introducing a conflict of in-
terest into the three different information treatments. Here we obtain the following results, as 
presented in table 5.1: 
 Sender Receiver 
Treatment CorrSM, b=0 CorrSM, b=2 CorrMA, b=0 CorrMA, b=2 
T1 "intransparent" 0.946 0.616 0.809 0.600 
T2 "semi-transparent" 0.921 0.686 0.812 0.773 
T3 "disclosed" 0.995 0.443 1 0.395 
Table 5.1: Effects of Conflict of Interest 
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Regarding the first hypothesis, as expected there is almost perfect information transmission 
without the bias across all treatment variations. This confirms the prediction based on the 
model from Crawford and Sobel (1982) that correlations between states and message are one. 
Moreover, we can confirm that shifting from the non-biased to the biased-setting the informa-
tion transmitted by the sender drops. Nevertheless, there is still a positive correlation between 
states and messages. Therewith we can corroborate similar results, finding an “overcommuni-
cation phenomenon” (Cai and Wang, 2006; Wang et al., 2010). More importantly, without a 
prevailing conflict of interest the disclosed treatment gives the most truthful messages, 
whereas with a conflict of interest the disclosed treatment gives the least truthful messages.53 
These tendencies are still in line with the theory, but the correlation of states and messages in 
T3 being 0.443 and thus significantly different from zero necessitates further discussion. Pos-
sible explanations are that strategic considerations limit the amount of truth distortion or 
senders feel morally obliged to lie only within certain boundaries. This discussion is taken up 
in the next section with a more detailed analysis of sender behaviour.   
For the receiver responses, we find that they also approach or equal one in the setting without 
a conflict of interest. However, as the bias is implemented, the credulity decreases. Receivers 
trust senders’ advice more in the two non-disclosure treatments.54 When conflicts of interest 
are disclosed, a receiver is less credulous on a sender’s biased message. More importantly, 
senders are more successful in misleading receivers when conflicts of interest are not made 
transparent. The change in the intransparent treatment, shifting from the non-biased to biased 
setting, is insignificant. The same holds for the second treatment, where we would have ex-
pected some adjustment of the receivers actions, because now they were well informed about 
the possibility of bias. In the disclosed treatment we observe a significant drop of following 
behaviour, which is in line with our predictions. But still there is a correlation of 0.395 which 
is significantly different from the theoretic prediction of 0. Hence in the disclosed and semi-
transparent treatment receivers are overly credulous.  
                                                          
53
  These differences from T3 are significant at a 5%-level in T1 and at a 1%-level in T2, respectively. For T1 
with p = 0.016 (two-sided) and for T2 with p < 0.01 (two-sided), each with reference to T3. Significance of 
the difference between two correlations from two independent samples is tested using Fischer’s r-to-z trans-
formation.  
54
  The correlation between messages and actions in T2 is significantly different from T3 at a 1%-level (two-
sided).     
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Coming to the second hypothesis we compare the general efficiency of information transmis-
sion for the different treatments. We find that without a conflict of interest, there is no signifi-
cant difference in terms of information transmission as predicted. 
Treatment CorrSA, b=0 CorrSA, b=2 
T1 "intransparent" 0.729 0.451 
T2 "semi-transparent" 0.780 0.620 
T3 "disclosed" 0.995 0.198 
Table 5.2: Information Transmission across Treatments 
However, with the conflict of interest there is significantly less information transmission in 
the disclosed treatment than in the two other treatments.55 In fact the correlation of 0.198 
shows that information transmission converges to zero in this treatment. 
5.4.2 Results of Sender Behaviour  
After having established the main insights for the overall game, we now focus on hypothesis 3 
and a more detailed analysis of the sender behaviour. Based on these findings we have a 
closer look at strategic elements of deception. Table 5.3 shows the high rates of deception in 
all treatments, where there is a conflict of interest. First of all we can state, that there is a trend 
towards less deception, when increasing the degree of transparency. Thus full disclosure of 
conflicts does increase the frequency of lying as one might suspect.56 Therefore the frequency 
of lying can still not explain the behaviour in all biased treatments.  
Treatment Percentage of deception 
T1 "intransparent" 78% 
T2 "semi-transparent" 69% 
T3 "disclosed" 67% 
Table 5.3: Frequencies of Deceptive Messages in Percent when b=2 
Next we consider the extent of exaggeration, which is defined as the difference between a 
sender’s message and the true state of the world (see figure 5.1). Here we find that increasing 
                                                          
55
  The differences in all these correlations between the three treatments are however not significant. 
56
  However, the differences between the three treatments are not statistically significant using a Mann- 
     Whitney Test. 
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the transparency level also significantly increases the extent of the lies. In particular, for T1 
the extent of exaggeration is 1.22 and for T3 it is 1.79.57 Therefore not the frequency of lies 
but their size drives the overall results for deception in the disclosed treatment. 
 
Figure 5.1: Average Extent of Exaggeration (b=2) 
Nevertheless, the average extent of exaggeration is still below the theoretical prediction of 2. 
So from a theoretical perspective our experiment shows that senders do lie less often and to a 
less higher degree than predicted.58 Thus hypothesis 3 is only partially confirmed, senders feel 
more morally licensed to distort the truth under disclosure, but they still overcommunicate.  
5.4.3 Results of Receiver Behaviour  
Next we discuss the data concerning receiver behaviour. Analogously to frequency and extent 
in the sender’s lying, we can break down the receiver’s following behaviour into frequency 
and extent of discounting. For the frequencies, the data from table 5.4 shows that receivers are 
following senders’ messages in about 50% of the cases in all three treatments. 50% is also the 
ex ante probability one would expect for accidentally following an honest message. However, 
the main question is whether receivers have learned to distinguish trustworthy from deceptive 
messages in the game. Therefore we compare the frequencies of following honest messages 
                                                          
57
  Mann-Whitney Test with p = 0.041 (two-sided). The differences in the sizes of exaggeration between T1 and 
T2 as well as between T2 and T3 are not significant. 
58
  Consequently, our data on average payoffs shows that for the conflict of interest deceptive senders receive 
higher payoffs for all treatments. So lying in this game of information-transmission pays off (see appendix 
table A3). 
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and following dishonest messages. In the two non-disclosed treatments there is little deviation 
from the 50% probability of following a dishonest or honest message.  
Treatment general  following 
not following  
dishonest  
message 
not following  
honest  
message 
T1 "intransparent" 51% 51% 47% 
T2 "semi-transparent" 47% 62% 45% 
T3 "disclosed" 51% 77% 27% 
Table 5.4: Frequencies of Receivers Following Senders’ Messages 
However, in the disclosed treatment we find 77% of the receivers not following deceptive 
messages any more.59 Overall, while the degree of transparency is increasing from T1 to T3, a 
gradual increase in the frequencies of not following deceptive messages is observed.60 Look-
ing at the receiver’s behaviour regarding honest messages proves that in the disclosed treat-
ment the receivers also follow honest messages less frequently. Hence receivers’ propensity to 
distrust in the disclosed setting also has a negative impact on their following behaviour.61  
 
Figure 5.2: Average Extent of Discounting Dishonest Messages 
                                                          
59
  The difference between T1 and T3 of not following a lie is significant at a 10%-level. Mann-Whiney-U-Test 
with p = 0.063 (two-sided).  
60
  The difference between T2 and T3 is however not significant.      
61
  The differences between the treatments of not following an honest message is highly significant at a 1%-level 
between T1 and T3 and weakly significant at a 10%-level between T2 and T3. Mann-Whiney-U-Test with 
p<0.01 (two-sided) for difference between T1 and T3 and with p = 0.094 (two-sided) between T2 and T3.  
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As the analysis of frequencies has shown, the receivers often do not follow a sender’s mes-
sage; this means they mistrust their given advice. Figure 5.2 illustrates the average extent of 
discounting dishonest messages for all treatments. Here, one would expect a trend analogous 
to figure 5.1, where the increasing degree of transparency gradually pushes the extent of dis-
counting. However, this is not reflected in the data. Generally, the disclosed treatment yields 
the highest discount rates, but there are no significant differences between the treatments. Re-
ceivers are unable to find the right extent for discounting messages. In neither treatment the 
theoretical optimum of discounting by the full bias of 2 is realised.62 Thus hypothesis 4 cannot 
be confirmed, as receivers’ do not sufficiently adapt their discounting behaviour, when in-
formed about the conflict of interest.  
5.4.4 Gender Effect 
Considering a potential gender effect, a recent study of Dreber and Johannesson (2008) found 
that men are significantly more likely to lie in order to achieve higher payoffs than women. 
Thus in their study, women are subject to a higher degree of lie-aversion in comparison to 
men.63 Regarding the frequencies of deception, no differences between men and women can 
be observed in our study. Contrary to Dreber and Johannesson (2008), biased women (73%) 
and biased men (70%) are almost equally likely to lie in our experiment. This result is also 
consistent with the sizes of exaggeration, which are on average nearly the same for female 
(1.47) and male (1.52) participants, with no remarkable differences between the treatments. 
Interestingly, a significant difference between the behaviour of male and female receivers is 
found in the sizes of discounting dishonest messages. In treatment 1 the average size of dis-
counting is 1.93 units for males and is 1.00 unit for females.64 Overall male receivers dis-
counted deceptive messages by 1.43 units and female receivers by 1.23 units, which is also a 
                                                          
62
  With regard to the pay-off realization we obtain results similar to the sender’s analysis. Firstly, all interac-
tions without a lie yield the highest payoffs for the receiver (Wilcoxon-signed-rank-test with p = 0.066). This 
is only consequent as we have just concluded, that receiver’s do not discount lies enough. Secondly, it is in 
line with the theory that not following a lie results in higher payoffs than following a lie. 
63
  This is consistent with other results from the literature, where women show more generous behaviour than 
males, for example, in a punishment game (Eckel and Grossman (1996)) in a dictator game (Eckel and 
Grossman (1998)) and in a solidarity game (Selten and Ockenfels (1998)). See also Croson and Gneezy 
(2004) for a review of gender differences.  
64
  This is significant at a 5% level for T3; Mann-Whitney Test with p = 0.034 (two-sided). The difference for 
T2 is also weakly significant at a 10%-level with p = 0.099 (two-sided).  
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significant difference.65 One explanation for females discounting exaggerated messages by a 
smaller amount may be due to the fact that females were more trusting when conflicts remain 
covered. Another explanation consistent with Eckel and Grossman (1998) is that females in 
the non-disclosure treatments are more interested in fair allocations, i.e. more equal payoffs, 
which can be achieved by a more moderate size of discounting.  
5.4.5 Subject’s Beliefs 
In the post-experimental questionnaire, subjects in the role of the senders were asked for their 
beliefs about average actions of the receivers for each of the five possible messages when 
b=2. Subjects in the role of the receivers on the other hand were asked for their beliefs about 
average messages of the senders conditional on the five possible states when there is a conflict 
of interest. Firstly, we compare the beliefs of the senders with the optimal messages given that 
belief (see figure 5.3).66 The two left bars per bar-block show the average receivers’ actions in 
the experiment and the receivers’ actions expected by the senders regarding the five possible 
messages. For example, in case of a message of 3, the observed average action was 2.62 and 
the average sender’s belief about the receiver’s action was 2.58. 
 
Figure 5.3: Senders’ Beliefs about Receivers’ Actions (b=2) 
                                                          
65
  At a 10% level using the Mann-Whitney Test with p = 0.094 (two-sided). 
66
  Due to the fact that no differences about the beliefs in the questionnaires could be observed between the 
treatments, the figures depict average values over all treatments.   
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Overall, the senders’ average beliefs are a good predictor for the actual actions of the receiv-
ers. The two right bars per bar-block represent the senders’ actually observed messages re-
garding the five respective states and the senders’ optimal message given their stated beliefs, 
which is generated through the addition of the bias-value b=2 on the respective five beliefs of 
the senders. For example in case of a state of 1, the observed average message was 2.77 com-
pared to the optimal message of 3.50 based on the senders’ average beliefs. This shows that 
sender’s have very precise estimates about the receiver’s actions given their message. Interest-
ingly, they do not inflate their messages to the theoretically optimal extent but to a lower ex-
tent which indicates some fairness concerns and is consistent with the overcommunication 
effect as already argued.  
A similar pattern can be observed for the receivers’ beliefs about the behaviour of the senders 
(see figure 5.4). The two left bars per bar-bock represent the observed average messages and 
the receivers’ average beliefs about the messages of the senders regarding the five respective 
states. Here the receivers’ beliefs serve again as a good predictor for the average messages of 
the senders, even if receivers somewhat underestimate the actual messages. The two right bars 
per bar-block show the actual receivers’ actions given the five possible messages and the re-
ceivers’ optimal actions given their beliefs, calculated by the subtraction of the bias value b=2 
from their stated beliefs about the messages. Again, participants’ observed behaviour is not in 
line with their beliefs. Receivers’ actual actions are all above the optimal actions given their 
beliefs.  
 
Figure 5.4: Receivers’ Beliefs about Senders’ Messages (b=2) 
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In conclusion, neither the senders nor the receivers sufficiently adjusted their average decision 
behaviour to their respective beliefs about the opponents’ decisions. This is consistent with 
the sender’s overcommunication effect and the receiver’s general failure to discount messages 
strong enough.  
5.4.6 Behaviour Type Analysis 
Also our data can be discussed in the light of different behavioural types among the subjects. 
This assumes that people have different levels of sophistication due to their reasoning capa-
bilities.67 We follow Crawford’s (2003) definition of a system of behaviour types.68 Accord-
ingly, the sender with the lowest level of sophistication is defined as truster type, because he 
truthfully sends messages that are consistent with the drawn states. Analogously, the receiver 
with the lowest level of sophistication is denoted as believer type. Thus both types of the low-
est level of sophistication are non-strategic, as they make no attempt to use their information 
about their counterpart's incentives to predict their decisions. The next level of sophistication 
sender is called liar type. He believes that the receiver is the believer type and adjusts his 
messages to the receiver’s naive reactions thereby maximising his own payoff. The next level 
of sophistication for the receiver is defined as inverter type. Finally, the highest level for the 
sender is the sophisticated liar type, who plays the best response to the inverter type, i.e. to 
always send message 5 irrespectively of the true state of the world. The receiver’s best re-
sponse to a sophisticated liar is to always choose action three. This type is denoted as equilib-
rium inverter.69  
A given subject can be mapped to one behaviour type, if the subject’s behaviour is consistent 
with that type for more than 60% of his decisions.70 About 75% of all participants can be clas-
sified. For the senders we get the following classification results: 
 
                                                          
67
   See for example Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta (2001), Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006).  
68
   For the formal definition of the behaviour types refer to appendix 5.6.2. 
69
  Theoretically also an equilibrium type sender exists on the fourth level of sophistication, which just randomly 
sends any message. But for our classification it is not meaningful to identify an equilibrium type sender, be-
cause all messages would be compatible with this type.  
70
  In case a participant is consistent with more than one type by the 60%-rule, he is classified as the type he is 
most compatible with. If there is a tie between the types, we assign the participant into the respective lower 
type-class. This is in line with a similar investigation by Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006). 
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Type name 
Level of  
sophistication 
 Number of classifiable senders per treatment 
T1 “intranspar-
ent” 
T2 ”semi-
transparent” 
T3 “dis-
closed” 
Truster L0 0 1 3 
Liar L1 12 9 2 
Sophisticated 
Liar L2 0 1 7 
N/A  4 5 4 
% classified   75% 68.8% 75% 
Table 5.5: Behaviour Type Classification for Senders 
Comparing the three transparency treatments, we find that in the two intransparent treatments 
the simple liar is the dominating player. But in the fully disclosed treatment senders respond 
to the fact that their bias is publicly known and become more sophisticated liars.  
These results are consistent with the overcommunication effect. Due to a lack of sophistica-
tion senders transmit too much information compared with the theoretical prediction. Regard-
ing the receivers, the following classifications can be made: 
Type name 
Level of  
sophistication 
 Number of classifiable receivers per treatment 
T1 „intranspar-
ent“ 
T2 „semi-
transparent“ 
T3 „dis-
closed“ 
Believer L0 6 6 3 
Inverter L1 4 1 7 
Equilibrium 
Type L2 3 3 0 
N/A  3 6 6 
% classified   81.3% 62.5% 62.5% 
Table 5.6: Behaviour Type Classification for Receivers 
Here the overall degree of sophistication is lower than for the senders. Especially, there is a 
lack of equilibrium type players in the disclosed treatment. This finding is consistent with the 
already obtained result that receivers are more credulous to senders’ messages in the non-
disclosure settings.  
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5.5 Conclusions and Outlook  
This study is motivated by the classical principal-agent conflict as for example in giving fi-
nancial advice. Our experimental design takes up the established model of Crawford and So-
bel (1982) and introduces different degrees of transparency as a new feature. Thus with our 
different treatments we test the effect of intransparency (T1), semi-transparency (T2) and full 
disclosure (T3) on conflicts of interest in a basic information transmission game.  
Overall, the increase in transparency had a significant effect on the behaviour with respect to 
conflicts of interest. It increases senders’ lying behaviour, although they do not lie up to the 
theoretical optimum. This confirms the existence of an overcommunication effect. Receivers 
are alert to distrust messages, but they do not discount enough. Furthermore, there is no sig-
nificant difference between the intransparent and semi-transparent treatment. Apparently, sub-
jects in our experiment did not experience the mere possibility of a bias as salient enough to 
adapt their behaviour. Finally, full disclosure of conflicts does not prevent a majority of advi-
sors from deceiving their clients. In the two non-disclosure treatments some fairness concerns 
must have prevented senders from inflating their advices to a higher extent. Finally, we ap-
plied a behaviour type analysis. Here, the lack of sophistication might be an explanation for 
the non-equilibrium behaviour of both parties in the disclosure treatment. In fact, none of the 
receivers and only few senders adopted the equilibrium strategy when conflicts were dis-
closed.  
Guiding future research, in contrast to previous studies such as Cai and Wang (2006), we in-
troduced a partner-matching into the experimental design. However, we could not find any 
trends for reputation building. So maybe extending the partner-matching to a game of more 
than ten periods can facilitate studying reputation effects. Another extension with reference to 
a real word situation could be the following. As recipients of advice often obtain a second 
opinion from another expert, one could incorporate the possibility for receivers to get a sec-
ond message from another advisor for a certain cost.  
  
5.6 Appendix 
5.6.1 Additional Results 
Figure 5.5: Average 
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Sizes of Exaggeration and Discounting 
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5.6.2 Behaviour Type Definitions 
Type name 
Level of  
sophistication 
Sender's message, given s 
s = 1 s = 2 s = 3 s = 4 s = 5 
Truster L0 1 2 3 4 5 
Liar L1 3 4 5 5 5 
Sophisticated 
Liar L2 5 5 5 5 5 
Table 5.7: Classification definition of behaviour types for senders (b=2) 
 
Type name 
Level of  
sophistication 
Receiver's action, given m 
m = 1 m = 2 m = 3 m = 4 m = 5 
Believer L0 1 2 3 4 5 
Inverter L1 1 1 1 2 3 
Equilibrium In-
verter L2 3 3 3 3 3 
Table 5.8: Classification definition of behaviour types for receivers71 
 
  
                                                          
71
  For T1 and T2 the definition is applicable for b=0 and b=2, because there is ambiguity about the bias; in T3 
the definition is just applicable for b=2 as the receivers are informed about the value of b at the beginning of 
each period.  
- 89 - 
5.6.3 Instructions 
Below we show the instructions translated from German: 
Instructions 
Welcome to today’s experiment and thank you for your participation. Please read the follow-
ing instructions carefully; the instructions are the same for all participants. If you have a ques-
tion, please do not hesitate to raise your hand, we will personally help you. 
You can earn money in this experiment. How much money you earn depends on your deci-
sions and the decisions of the other participants. At the end of the experiment you will be paid 
in cash. The payoff consists of your accumulated earnings from the respective rounds plus a 
show-up fee of 2.50€. In the experiment we will use “ECU” as currency. 100ECU stands for 
1€ (100ECU=1E). 
From now on, please do not communicate with other participants. Please also ensure that your 
mobile phone is switched off. Violating these rules can result in the exclusion from the ex-
periment. All interactions in this experiment will take place through the computers. 
The experiment consists of ten payoff-relevant rounds. At the beginning of the experiment 
you will be randomly matched with another participant with whom you will interact for the 
first ten rounds. One participant will be assigned the role of “participant A” the other one as 
“participant B”.  You will be informed about your role at the beginning of the experiment. 
You will maintain your role during the whole experiment. Your decisions and payments are 
anonymous.   
Procedure of one period 
• At the beginning of each round the computer randomly determines a random number 
Z. This random number can take the values 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5. Only participant A will be 
informed about the randomly generated value of Z. 
• After participant A has received the information about Z, he sends a message to par-
ticipant B: ”The random number I have received is X”. For X, participant A can 
choose every value out of the values 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, independently of the randomly 
generated value of the random number.  
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• After participant B has received the message about the value of the random number 
from participant A, he decides for an action. Participant B can choose for an action out 
of the actions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.          
 
Calculation of the income from one period 
The income from each period for participant A and participant B depends on the random 
number Z and on participant B’s action. Participant B’s income is higher when his action is 
closer to the random number. In comparison to participant B, participant A can be subject to a 
difference of interest I. In case of I=2, participants A’s income is higher when participant B’s 
action is closer to the random number plus the value of the difference of interest. In case of 
I=0, there is no difference of interest and participant A’s income is higher when participants 
B’s action is closer to the random number. 
 
T1 “intransparent”: At the beginning of each period, participant A will be informed about the 
value of the difference of interest. Participant B however receives no further information 
about the value of the difference of interest.  
 
T2 “semi-transparent”: At the beginning of each period, participant A will be informed about 
the value of the difference of interest. Participant B is however just informed that the prob-
ability for I=2 is 50 percent.     
 
T3 “disclosed”: At the beginning of each period, participant A as well as participant B will be 
informed about the value of the difference of interest.  
The exact incomes, which occur for participant A and participant B in case of no difference of 
interest, can be seen in the following table:    
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Table of incomes for participant A and participant B without difference of interest:          
 Possible actions of the receiver 
 
 
Possible 
values of 
the random 
number Z 
 action=1 action=2 action=3 action=4 action=5 
Z=1 110 100 84 63 40 
Z=2 100 110 100 84 63 
Z=3 84 100 110 100 84 
Z=4 63 84 100 110 100 
Z=5 40 63 84 100 110 
 
Without the difference of interest (I=0), participant A as well as participant B achieves the 
highest possible payoff when the difference between the random number and participant B’s 
action is as small as possible. For example, if the random number is 2 and participant B’s ac-
tion is also 2, both players each achieve the income of 110 in this period.  
When the difference of interest exists, participant A’s income is higher when participant B’s 
action is closer to the random number plus the value of the difference of interest. The follow-
ing table shows participant A’s and participant B’s income per period when participant A is 
subject to the difference of interest (I=2). The respective left value in each possible concourse 
of random number and action represents participant A’s income and the right value participant 
B’s income, respectively.  
Table of incomes for participant A and participant B with difference of interest: 
 
Here, participant A’s income takes the highest possible value when participant B’s action is 
equal to the random plus two. Participant B still achieves the highest possible income when 
      Possible actions of the receiver 
 
 
Possible 
values of 
the random 
number Z 
 action=1 action=2 action=3 action=4 action=5 
Z=1   84  110 100 100 110 84 100 63 84 40 
Z=2 63 100 84 110 100 100 110 84 100 63 
Z=3 40 84 63 100 84 110 100 100 110 84 
Z=4 15 63 40 84 63 100 84 110 100 100 
Z=5 -13 40 15 63 40 84 63 100 84 110 
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his action matches the value of the random number. For example, when the random number 
takes the value of two, participant A’s highest possible income occurs when participant B 
decides for the action=4. However, participant B’s highest possible income occurs when he 
decides for action=2.  
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Example: Screenshot for participant B 
 
 
 
 
                  
 
Column with 
possible values 
the random num-
In the rows: Information about the 
respective payoffs depending on the 
random number Z, on participant 
Participant A’s message 
about the random number 
Input box for 
participant B’s 
- 94 - 
6 Two Dimensional Fairness in a Real Effort Game 
6.1 Introduction 
The impact of fairness on economic decision making is already well established in the litera-
ture on various distribution, market and other games (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999).72 The currently existing models essentially formalise fairness in terms of a 
one-dimensional function of monetary pay-offs. However, in many real life encounters, the 
issue of multi-dimensional fairness may play a crucial role, i.e. payment, effort and ability 
might all shape our perception of fairness to some extent. We concentrate on the fairness of 
wages as prime example, since Akerlof and Yellen (1990) found that workers reduce efforts, 
when their wage decreases with reference to what they find to be the fair wage. Furthermore, 
when considering the relation of working effort and payments, as a matter of fact we know 
that people in jobs with high wages also typically work long hours (e.g. investment bankers, 
lawyers and management consultants). This phenomenon is so striking that we have pervasive 
evidence even with macro level data. Aguiar and Hurst (2008) for example,  find that the rela-
tive wage increase for well educated employees over the last decades is accompanied by a 
large relative increase in working hours.  
We study the general relationship between working effort and monetary payments in a labour 
economics setting. Therefore we devise a real effort game to investigate fairness along these 
two dimensions. In our design, subjects participate in a meaningful real effort task with two 
player types. Players A receive 12€ and players B 2€ as a fixed payment for the same task, 
which they can pursue as long as they want. Overall, they have only two decisions to make. 
Firstly, they can decide how long they work, whilst they are informed about the working time 
and payment of a matched partner. Secondly, they can redistribute respectively bargain over 
the difference in fixed payments. With regard to the two pivotal dimensions of fairness we 
extend a standard model of social preferences with an additional conversion factor for time 
and money, allowing us to derive predictions for the offers and acceptance thresholds in the 
redistribution stage. 
                                                          
72
  This chapter is joint work with Georg Gebhardt. 
- 95 - 
Regarding working times, we find results consistent with the existing literature on gift-
exchange games. For monetary transfers, our aggregate data is also consistent with standard 
results from the dictator and ultimatum game literature. However, when combining the two 
dimensions, we can estimate the conversion factor for time and money. From this new per-
spective, we are able to expose a self-serving bias effect, substantiating that the high endow-
ment players A distort their conversion factor to justify lower offers. 
Section 2 discusses the related theoretical and experimental literature. Section 3 presents our 
experimental design and procedures. Section 4 introduces the extension of a social prefer-
ences model with a conversion factor for time and money.  Then section 5 delivers our ex-
perimental results in terms of working times and monetary transfers. Finally, the main in-
sights are summarised in section 6. 
6.2 Related Literature 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no literature on multi-dimensional outcome fairness, 
yet. Hence, we start with a theoretical and experimental analysis studying the impact of two-
dimensional fairness based on time and money. Nevertheless, this general idea relates to exist-
ing literature on social and fairness norms, where other non-monetary dimensions of fairness 
such as “spectator status” have already been discussed (Croson and Konow, 2009; Offermann, 
2002). More importantly, there is some literature showing that economic agents tend to distort 
some social norms to their own advantage, thus exhibiting a self-serving bias (Babcock and 
Loewenstein, 1997; Babcock et al., 1995). Moreover, our experimental design also relates to 
the standard literature on dictator and ultimatum games, which can also be taken to verify the 
robustness of our main results (Forsythe et al., 1994; Güth et al., 1982). Finally, the literature 
on social preferences (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) can be integrated 
in our theoretical derivation of hypotheses and help organising our results. Here the impor-
tance of equity norms to explain bargaining behaviour and how people perceive fairness in 
terms of pay-off distributions is already well-established. However, the interrelation of pay-
offs and working effort is not explicated in these models.  
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6.3 Experimental Design and Procedures 
We conducted a real effort game with two different types of players.73 One type receives a 
fixed payment of 12€ (A), the other receives 2€ (B). Therewith we induced initially unfair 
monetary payments. Then both player types were asked to perform a real effort task. Here, the 
payment for both was common knowledge and both had to perform the same task without any 
restrictions on their effort provision. The effort game literature stresses a crucial difference 
between hypothetical tasks and real effort tasks (Brüggen and Strobel, 2007; Garcia-Gallego 
et al., 2008). Here real effort tasks are generally taken more seriously and accordingly more 
working effort is provided. Even stressing this effect, we chose a meaningful real effort task, 
in order to avoid that subjects would quit the experiment prematurely. As the task we used 
questionnaires from a previous classroom experiment and asked the subjects to type these 
questionnaires into a computer mask to facilitate further scientific usage. In this experiment, 
we focused on extra working efforts, which are provided voluntarily. Hence, we did not stipu-
late exogenously given working times. Moreover, in order to avoid any obvious reference 
points, we scheduled the experiment for 2 hours, which was clearly too long for compensating 
the opportunity costs of the students, considering our fixed payments. Also we provided an 
affluence of 153 questionnaires per subject, in order to avoid that the subjects simply proc-
essed all questionnaires.74 These questionnaires were the same for all subjects and always had 
the same order. 
After being randomly matched to another player and being assigned a role as player A or 
player B, the experiment was structured into two essential parts. In the first stage, the real 
effort task was executed and subjects were continuously informed about their own working 
time and their partner’s working time. The players of a pair started at exactly the same time. 
Moreover, the two different fixed payments were always salient and common knowledge. We 
deliberately omitted any other information, such as the number of questionnaires typed in or 
accuracy. Therefore, working time and payment were the only two relevant dimensions of 
information, which could be observed. In addition, we implemented a pop-up box, which no-
tified one player as soon as the other player decided to finish his real effort task. This pop-up 
                                                          
73
  For the full experimental instructions refer to the appendix.    
74
 Additionally, in the instructions, we explicitly stressed that we did not expect that all questionnaires were 
used. 
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had to be confirmed, so that we could be certain all players realised when the associated part-
ner finished his effort stage. After this notification, the remaining players were free to carry 
on with their task, but the finished players had no opportunity to return to the real effort stage. 
In the second stage of the game the payments could be re-distributed based on the working 
time of the two players. Here, we implemented our three treatment variations as follows:  
Treatment 1) Effort Stage 2) Redistribution Stage 
Baseline (T1) yes no 
Dictator (T2) yes Dictator Game 
Ultimatum (T3) yes Ultimatum Game 
Table 6.1: Experimental Treatments 
In the baseline treatment (T1), both player types immediately leave after they have provided 
their effort. Hence, this treatment is a simple gift-exchange game between experimenter and 
subjects, with no interaction. In the dictator treatment (T2), we conduct a dictator game, 
where the high payment players A have the opportunity to balance the unequal payment, i.e. 
they can transfer a share (0 to 10€) of their excess earnings to their matched partner. In the 
ultimatum treatment (T3), we conduct an ultimatum game, where the high payment player A 
can make a bargaining offer (0 to 10€) to the low payment player B, who can accept the of-
fered contribution or reject and perish the surplus for both players. The standard ultimatum 
game protocol presupposes the responder to be still present, when he receives his offer. But as 
we wanted to avoid any externalities regarding work motivation in our design, we decided to 
capture the responder’s behaviour with the strategy method (Selten, 1967). Hence, each player 
was independent of the working status of his partner and could always leave the experiment, 
once he decided to finish the working task. Also in deviation from common experimental de-
signs, we framed the decisions in this one-shot game in Euros (€) rather than experimental 
currency units (ECU) to make the difference in payoffs immediately accessible.  
The experimental sessions took place in February and November 2010 at the Cologne Labora-
tory for Economic Research (CLER). In order to avoid the subjects influencing each other’s 
behaviour when leaving the room, we invited four groups of 8 subjects for each session, 
which entered the laboratory in waves with a time delay of 15 minutes for each wave. Hence, 
the groups remained big enough to maintain anonymity between subjects, but by having vari-
ous groups in different stages of the experiment at any time, whenever someone left the labo-
ratory it became unclear, how long this particular individual had previously worked. The sub-
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jects were seated randomly and there was no opportunity for communication. Subject pay-
ments were organised with payment receipts to ensure that subjects could immediately leave 
the laboratory, when they decided to finish the experiment. In exchange for the payment re-
ceipt, the subject could collect the cash payment during the next weeks. We had 64 students 
per treatment and 192 students overall participating. The average payment was 9€ including a 
guaranteed show-up fee of 2.50€. On average each subject participated in the experiment for 
50 minutes. For the recruitment we used the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 
2004) and the experiment itself was programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).  
6.4 Model of Tow-Dimensional Fairness and Hypotheses  
In the following three hypotheses are outlined, based on an extended standard model for so-
cial preferences. The first hypothesis for our experiment comes straightforward from the lit-
erature on gift-exchange games. In the baseline treatment we provide no opportunity for redis-
tribution or interaction. Hence, fairness considerations do not apply between subjects, but 
rather between the individual subject and the experimenter giving the endowment (Akerlof, 
1982; Fehr et al., 1993). Here, we expect that subjects take the endowment as a gift and pro-
vide working effort in exchange. The players A with the much higher endowment of 12€ will 
work harder than the players B with the cheap endowment of 2€.  
Hypothesis 1: Players A provide higher working efforts than players B. 
To derive further hypotheses for our experimental design, we formalise our notion of two-
dimensional fairness based on the model of outcome-fairness by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). 
With initial endowments A and B we induce inequality in our basic set-up. Accordingly, 2 
and 2  represent the initial monetary distributions from either player’s perspective. With i 
and i  we denote the players final working times. Moreover, the fairness parameters ¡, ¢ are 
taken from the basic Fehr and Schmidt model. Here ¡ is the loss of utility from inequality to 
one’s disadvantage, ¢ is the loss of utility from inequality to one’s own advantage. To incor-
porate the new aspect of two-dimensional fairness, we extend the model with a conversion 
factor for the exchange between time and money £. On this basis we can make predictions 
how different effort levels weigh off with monetary redistributions. The resulting utility func-
tion is: 
2 , 2  , i , i    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2  ¡ · maxC2   2  £i   i, 0D  ¢ · maxC2  2   £i  i , 0D 
One of our implicit assumptions is that both player types assess fairness in terms of both di-
mensions and not solely based on monetary outcomes. This can also be tested with our expe-
rimental data.  
Hypothesis 2: Both dimensions of fairness are reflected in the subjects’ behaviour. 
Next the most innovative hypothesis directly building on the model extension is derived in 
some more detail. In the dictator game we have a player A in the dictator role and a passive 
player B receiving a monetary transfer. If ¢ - 0.5, then the proposer offers the equal split. 
For players with ¢ / 0.5 the resulting offer is by definition always zero. Hence, for the dicta-
tor we can predict the following offer defined as E¤: 
E¤  ¥ 0, W ¢ / 0.5 ¦  £¤i¤  i§ - 10  12 12  2  £¤i¤  i§	, W¢ - 0.5 ¨  £¤i¤  i§ A 10  V 
The additional assumptions regarding the conversion factor £ above are necessary, to deal 
with cases, where the monetary equivalent of working time exceeds the initially induced sur-
plus of 10€. In these cases, offers cannot be negative, but must be zero. In the ultimatum 
treatment we can determine what players B are minimally willing to accept. For the responder 
B, we obtain the following solution: 
E§  ¥ 0, W  £§i¤  i§ - 10  ¡1 N 2¡ 12  2  £§i¤  i§	, W £§i¤  i§ A 10V 
Again, as an additional assumption we have to demand that  £§i¤  i§ A 10, otherwise the 
offer constituted by the additional working effort would exceed the surplus of 10€. In these 
cases, offers cannot be negative, but must be zero. 
In order to ultimately compare the behaviour of redistribution in both treatments, one must 
rely on some distribution of the standard fairness parameters ¡ and ¢, specifying the offer and 
acceptance threshold. For this purpose, we take the established distributions from Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999). First, for the dictator game treatment, we assume that 60% of all players have ¢ / 0.5 and 40% have ¢ - 0.5. Then one can calculate the expected offer of the average 
player as: 
E©¤  0.4 · ª10  £¤i¤  i§2 «  2  0.2£¤i¤  i§ 
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For the ultimatum treatment we adopt existing estimates for ¡ as provided by an aggregate 
study from Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Based on several studies on ultimatum games, they find 
4% of ¡  0.125, 25% of ¡  0.75 and 71% of ¡  2.75 With this parameterisation, we ac-
count for the different strategic situation in the ultimatum game regarding fairness and can 
further specify the acceptance threshold of players B in the ultimatum treatment as: 
E©§  ¬0.04 · 110 N 0.25 · 310 N 0.71 · 920­ · 10  £§i¤  i§	  3.99  0.399£§i¤  i§ 
This shows that the base rate of acceptance from player B is twice as high as the base rate of 
an offer of player A in the dictator treatment. The same holds for the decline of the slope, 
when player A provides more working effort. Having obtained this solution for the acceptance 
threshold, we can relate the two treatments and the behaviour of both player types. Taking the 
partial derivative for both treatments we obtain: 
®E¤®i¤  i§  0.2 · £¤ 
®E§®i¤  i§  0.399 · £§ 
Next, we take the above results and determine the relation between the two conversion factors 
in both treatments as:  
£¤ ¯ 2£§  
If behaviour in our setting of two-dimensional fairness is not influenced by a self-serving bias 
of players A, then we must also find the predicted £¤  2£§ in the experimental data. By con-
trast, if we were to find £¤ - 2£§, then subjects would exhibit a self-serving bias effect when 
deciding on the redistribution of the surplus 10€.  
Hypothesis 3: There is no self-serving bias effect: γ± is equal to 2γ². 
                                                          
75
  According to the model, the ¡ directly translate into acceptance thresholds for the offer in terms of the over-
all surplus, which can be offered. Here ¡  0.125 equals an offer of 10%, ¡  0.75 equals an offer of 30% 
and ¡  2 equals an offer of 45%. 
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6.5 Experimental Results  
The following experimental analysis is structured along the two dimensions of fairness. First, 
we consider behaviour in terms of working times provided in the real effort stage. Then we 
analyse the monetary transfers from the redistribution stage. Finally, we combine both dimen-
sions, which allow us to make inferences about the trade-off between monetary transfer and 
working effort. This can also confirm our self-serving bias hypothesis.  
6.5.1 Working Times in the Real Effort Task 
First, we consider our data in terms of working efforts. The following table depicts the aver-
age behaviour of the two player types:  
Treatment Player A (12€) Player B (2€) 
Baseline (T1) 45.0 min 28.8 min 
Dictator (T2) 44.1 min 29.6 min 
Ultimatum (T3) 41.0 min 35.2 min 
Table 6.2: Working Effort across Treatments 
For both the dictator and the ultimatum treatment, we find no significant changes regarding 
average working times for the two player types.76 On average, each type provides the same 
effort levels in the effort stage independent of the nature of the subsequent distribution stage. 
Moreover, the differences between player types are what we expected from the literature on 
gift-exchange games and in line with our first hypothesis. Working times for players A are 
significantly higher in all treatments.77 
6.5.2 Monetary Offers in the Redistribution Treatments 
In the following we focus on the second stage of the experiment, where we have varied the 
redistribution protocol and have observed different monetary transfers. In this stage the differ-
ence of working time between the two players in each pair becomes relevant, as the subjects 
                                                          
76
   A pairwise analysis of treatments using a Mann-Whitney test yields, that the largest difference, i.e. the work-
ing time of player B in the baseline and in the ultimatum treatment still has a p-value of = 0.295. Overall, we 
find no significant differences when comparing the treatments.  
77
   The difference in the dictator treatment is significant on a 1%-level, the differences in the baseline and ulti-
matum treatment are significant on a 5%-level.  
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may decide to condition their proposal and acceptance on the surplus or shortcoming in work-
ing time of their partner.  
Treatment Mean Offer in € 
Baseline (T1) -   
Dictator (T2) 1.2€   
Ultimatum (T3) 4.1€*** 
Table 6.3: Mean Offers across Treatments 
But first, only considering the mean offers by players A from table 6.3, we basically repro-
duce standard results from the literature on bargaining games. Accordingly, the mean offers in 
the dictator treatment are significantly lower than in the ultimatum treatment.78 
More interestingly, the monetary offers can be put in perspective with the difference in work-
ing time in minutes. For the dictator game treatment we can plot figure 6.1 illustrating the 
offers proposed by player A conditional on the difference in working effort.  
 
Figure 6.1: Surplus in Working Time (A) and Offers in Euro (T2) 
Here we can see that most players type A work longer than their partner, whereas only a few 
players type A work shorter than their partner. Analogous to the dictator treatment we can 
plot how the difference in working time affects the offers in the ultimatum game treatment: 
                                                          
78
 T-test: p-value = 0.000. 
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Figure 6.2: Surplus in Working Time (A) and Offers in Euro (T3) 
Here, the data nodes are centred on a significantly higher mean. Also we find some very fair 
or even altruistic offers ≥ 5 €. Overall, the data on offers in the two redistribution treatments 
proves that subjects base their decisions on both dimensions of fairness. Both slopes decline, 
showing that working time is converted into lower offers, giving credit to our notion of two-
dimensional fairness as postulated in the model.79 
6.5.3 Self-Serving Bias Effect 
Finally, in light of the differences in working time we can process how the two player types 
evaluate their own working surplus, when making an offer or acceptance in the redistribution 
stage. Dwelling upon the results from section 4, we thus compare the dictator offers of players 
A with the acceptance thresholds of players B in the ultimatum treatment. For this analysis, 
we only take positive differences in working time into account. Only in these cases, the pro-
poser could make an offer after having observed the relevant working time of his partner with 
certainty. For this constellation, we can plot the proposal and acceptance rates depending on 
the surplus of working time as in figure 6.3.  
                                                          
79
  To substantiate this finding we run linear regressions for both treatments and find that in the dictator treat-
ment we have a coefficient of -1.22 (p-value = 0.001) and in the ultimatum treatment of -2.94 (p-value = 
0.000) for the declining slope when taking the offers as the dependent variable. For details refer to appendix 
6.7.1. 
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Figure 6.3: Comparison of Offers and Acceptance Thresholds  
Due to the strategy method elicitation of acceptance behaviour in the ultimatum game, we are 
able to determine the responses of players B for the same working times as players A have 
provided in the dictator game. Based on the full specification, we can conduct this for every 
offer and for every difference in working times. Therefore, to connect both treatments we take 
the real observed working differences in the dictator treatment (red line) and the computed 
minimal acceptance thresholds in the ultimatum game, given exactly these working times 
(blue line). This provides a clean comparison of subjects’ behaviour between the two treat-
ments and for both player roles. In order to establish a self-serving bias effect we must find 
that: 
12 ®E¤®i¤  i§ - ®E§®i¤  i§ 
First, we determine the slopes of the decline in offers and acceptances for both players as:  
®E¤®i¤  i§  0.94 
®E§®i¤  i§  0.38 
On this basis we can calculate the conversion factors £¤ and £§:  
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£¤  5 ®E¤®i¤  i§  4.69 
£§  2.5 ®E§®i¤  i§  0.94 
We find that for the subjects’ behaviour in our experiment, £¤ is significantly higher than 2£§.80 Hence we assert the prevalence of a self-serving bias effect for the players A. With this 
effect, these players exaggerate the value of their own working time to justify very cheap of-
fers after providing some more effort. In fact they value their own working effort, as the basis 
for their offers, five times higher than the working effort of the receiving player is valued.  
6.6 Conclusions  
This paper has provided a first theoretical and experimental advance towards two-dimensional 
fairness. Therefore we have devised a standard real-effort game with a meaningful task and 
asymmetric payments of 12€ and 2€ for two player types, allowing for a redistribution of the 
surplus 10€. Further we appended it with different treatment variations regarding the redistri-
bution protocol and communicated working times towards the whole experiment, so that there 
were two dimensions to assess final outcome fairness; the differences in working time and the 
monetary redistribution. To substantiate our claims we extended a standard model of social 
preferences with our notion of two-dimensional fairness. This gives us clear predictions about 
the equilibrium behaviour of both player types. 
As a first result, we have reiterated that working times follow the typical behaviour of a gift-
exchange game. Across treatments, all players A with the higher endowment work signifi-
cantly longer than their counterparts. When putting the offers of players A in perspective with 
the differences in working time between both players, we confirm that our basic grasp of two-
dimensional fairness is reflected in the data. In both treatments, there is a robust trend proving 
that offers decline as the additional working effort increases. Therefore the players must 
weigh off the two dimensions of effort and payment. Finally, with recurrence to our theoreti-
cal model, we take the experimental data in order to estimate the average conversion factors 
of time and money for both player types. In contrast to the theoretical prediction, these factors 
                                                          
80
  Mann-Whitney Test: p-value = 0.039. 
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are significantly different, which leads us to the conclusion that players do not only assess 
fairness according to two dimensions, but are also subject to a self-serving bias in the dictator 
treatment. This bias distorts the conversion factor to their own advantage, justifying cheap 
offers. 
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6.7 Appendix 
6.7.1 Additional Results 
For the offers in the dictator treatment, we run a linear regression with robust standard errors: 
Dependent Variable: Offer Player A 
Variables  
Intercept 
 
1.48*** 
(0.304) 
Differences Working Time 
 
-1.22*** 
(0.349) 
N observations 32 
Prob > F 0.002 
MSE 1.399 8² 0.147 
Table 6.4: Linear Regression Profits Player A (robust standard errors) 
We find that there is a highly significant dependence between the decline of offers and the 
difference in working time, which here again are expressed in hours.  
The same regression model can be applied to the ultimatum treatment: 
Dependent Variable: Offer Player A 
Variables  
Intercept 
 
4.37*** 
(0.305) 
Differences Working Time 
 
-2.94*** 
(0.495) 
N observations 32 
Prob > F 0.000 
MSE 1.618 8² 0.265 
Table 6.5: Linear Regression Profits Player A (robust standard errors) 
Again the regression results show, that the relationship between offers from player A and the 
differences in working time is highly significant.  
6.7.2 Instructions 
Instructions 
Welcome and thank you for participating in today’s experiment. You will be able to earn 
money during this experiment. You will receive 2.50 € as a show-up fee. The following in-
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structions will outline how you can earn more. There will be new groups of people coming 
into the laboratory room during today’s session. Please do not let this disturb you. 
 
Please read the following instructions thoroughly. These are the same for all participants. 
Please do not hesitate to ask if you have any questions. However, we ask you to raise your 
hand and wait for us to come and assist you. We also ask you to restrain from communicating 
with other participants from now on until the end of the experiment. Please ensure that your 
mobile phone is switched off. Violating these rules can result in an exclusion from this expe-
riment. 
Course of the Experimental Task (Baseline Treatment) 
During this experiment you are expected to type in data from a questionnaire into the com-
puter. This data is intended for scientific research. The exact proceedings will be explained in 
the following part work instructions on the next page. During the experiment you will be 
paired with a second participant, who is working on the same questionnaires. You will there-
fore be assigned the role of either participant A or participant B. Your payoff depends on the 
role you are randomly assigned in the beginning. Participants A will receive 12 € for their 
work and participants B 2 €. All participants stay anonymous during the entire experiment.  
For your own reference and to be able to check your payoff you will be able to see the follow-
ing on your computer screen: how long you have already been working and if the participant 
you have been paired up with is still working. You additionally receive a message, when the 
other participant stops working. It is up to you to decide how many questionnaires you type in 
to the computer. 
Once you have stopped working on the questionnaires you will be given a summary of the 
work duration of both participants.  
You will receive your final payoff (plus the 2.50 € show-up fee) in cash on presentation of 
your payout slip during the following days. Please do not forget to take the payout slip on 
your desk with you after finishing the experiment.  
Course of the Experimental Task (Dictator Treatment) 
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During this experiment you are expected to type in data from a questionnaire into the com-
puter. This data is intended for scientific research. The exact proceedings will be explained in 
the following part work instructions on the next page. During the experiment you will be 
paired with a second participant, who is working on the same questionnaires. You will there-
fore be assigned the role of either participant A or participant B. Your payoff depends on the 
role you are randomly assigned in the beginning. Participants A will receive 12 € for their 
work and participants B 2 €. All participants stay anonymous during the entire experiment.  
For your own reference and to be able to check your payoff you will be able to see the follow-
ing on your computer screen: how long you have already been working and if the participant 
you have been paired up with is still working. You additionally receive a message, when the 
other participant stops working. It is up to you to decide how many questionnaires you type in 
to the computer. 
Once you have stopped working on the questionnaires you will be given a summary of the 
work duration of both participants. Participant A can then decide to transfer an amount be-
tween 0 and 10 € of his payoff to participant B (only integers). For this purpose participant A 
will see the following screen: 
 
You will receive your final payoff (plus the 2.50 € show-up fee) in cash on presentation of 
your payout slip during the following days. Please do not forget to take the payout slip on 
your desk with you after finishing the experiment.  
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Course of the Experimental Task (Ultimatum Treatment) 
During this experiment you are expected to type in data from a questionnaire into the com-
puter. This data is intended for scientific research. The exact proceedings will be explained in 
the following part work instructions on the next page. During the experiment you will be 
paired with a second participant, who is working on the same questionnaires. You will there-
fore be assigned the role of either participant A or participant B. Your payoff depends on the 
role you are randomly assigned in the beginning. Participants A will receive 12 € for their 
work and participants B 2 €. All participants stay anonymous during the entire experiment.  
For your own reference and to be able to check your payoff you will be able to see the follow-
ing on your computer screen: how long you have already been working and if the participant 
you have been paired up with is still working. You additionally receive a message, when the 
other participant stops working. It is up to you to decide how many questionnaires you type in 
to the computer. 
Once you have stopped working on the questionnaires you will be given a summary of the 
work duration of both participants. Participant A can then decide to transfer an amount be-
tween 0 and 10 € of his payoff to participant B (only integers). For this purpose participant A 
will see the following screen: 
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Participant B can determine in the following input screen, which offers from participant 
A he would accept: 
 
Participant B can here determine, whether he always accepts a certain offer, never accepts or 
whether he will accept it under the condition that participant A (12 €) has worked a certain 
amount of time. If participant A has made an offer, that participant B will accept, then the 10 
€ payoff difference will be allocated according to the offer of participant A. If however par-
ticipant B declines the offer, then the 10€ will not be divided and both parties receive a payoff 
of 2 €. 
You will receive your final payoff (plus the 2.50 € show-up fee) in cash on presentation of 
your payout slip during the following days. Please do not forget to take the payout slip on 
your desk with you after finishing the experiment.  
Work Instructions 
If you wish to accept a 
particular offer only 
under the condition that 
participant A has 
worked a certain 
amount of time, then 
If you wish to either 
always accept or 
decline a particular 
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A stack of questionnaires is placed on each desk. These questionnaires were filled in by other 
students during an earlier classroom experiment. These data needs to be digitalised for evalua-
tion. It is your task to type in the information into the form on your computer screen. The data 
will then be automatically transferred into an Excel-sheet. The participants of the classroom 
experiment were asked to answer 15 questions. These questions were labelled 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
1.o, 1.u, 2.o, 2.u, 3.o, 3.u, 4.o, 4.u, 5.o and 5.u. The participants were asked to give estimates 
in percentage points for each question. The following illustration is a screen shot of the data 
entry form: 
 
You are kindly asked to convey first of all the number in the right hand corner of the ques-
tionnaire into the box "number" on the screen for each questionnaire you process. After that 
please convey only the percentage figures of the left column of the form. Thus enter only 
the numbers for the categories "top" and "left" into their respective boxes on the screen. 
Please do not enter the percentage sign into the form. Please click OK after entering all the 
information. The data is thereby saved and transferred to the Excel-sheet. You can then con-
tinue with the next questionnaire. We very much appreciate your work and kindly ask you to 
be accurate with the input of the data. You are by no means required to process all question-
naires during this experiment. You can stop working any time by clicking the "Finish" button 
in the bottom left hand corner of the screen. You cannot return to the data entry form after 
quitting. 
Please click OK on your screen, once you have read these instructions, and wait for the other 
participants. A countdown will start, once all participants are ready. You will then be told 
whether you are participant A (12 €) or participant B (2 €) and you can then also start work-
ing.  
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7 Conclusions 
This thesis encompasses five contributions on information and fairness in behavioural eco-
nomics. Regarding information the following issues have been examined: information acqui-
sition in two different auction formats, the value of non-instrumental information is a second-
price sealed-bid auction, coordinative behaviour in a global game under two different kinds of 
uncertainty and deceptive behaviour in an information transmission game with a conflict of 
interest. For fairness, multi-dimensional fairness was embedded in a model of social prefer-
ences and self-serving bias behaviour was detected.  
In chapter 2, a very important scenario for real world applications of auctions was investi-
gated, i.e. auctions with information acquisition. In this set-up information acquisition to dis-
cover one’s private valuation for a good at auction is costly. The uncertainty about one’s pri-
vate valuation can occur for all kinds of goods from old books or CDs to corporate takeovers 
or spectrum auctions. The costs can be envisioned as the external costs of an expert opinion 
determining the valuation or as the internal cognitive cost for discovering one’s true valua-
tion. As this question is difficult to analyse with empirical or field data, we designed an ex-
periment exactly testing the theoretical predictions of a rational choice model. Starting with 
the predictions for a second-price sealed-bid and an English auction with different cost pa-
rameters, we found that subjects buy excess information as they fail to assess the correct value 
of this instrumental information. In line with this main result, we find further departures from 
the rational theory, such as premature information acquisition in the English auction and un-
derbidding in both formats. Extending the initial model with anticipated regret we can explain 
why subjects still buy information above the rational model’s threshold level and why they 
underbid, when not knowing their valuation.  
The clear results from chapter 2, refuting the rational theory for auctions with information 
acquisition, have raised a further question guiding the research for chapter 3. Here the sub-
jects’ behaviour dealing with non-instrumental information is scrutinised. Using a simple auc-
tion set-up subjects are provided with the opportunity to acquire the highest valuation of their 
competitors at a certain cost. This is non-instrumental information in the second-price sealed-
bid auction at hand. As a result the excess information acquisition behaviour is confirmed and 
is extended to non-instrumental information. Further, the bidding strategies exhibit underbid-
ding behaviour, which is striking given that the players, had full information about their own 
valuation. Overall, the experiments on auctions with information acquisition prove that hu-
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man agents assess the information provided in such a context very different from the predic-
tions of standard rational choice models. Considering the strong evidence both these contribu-
tions provide, this is an area where more experimental work is promising.  
With chapter 4 a specific theory is put on test, introducing risk and ambiguity as two kinds of 
uncertainty into a global game, framed as a speculative attack. First, we confirm that almost 
all subjects employ switching strategies. Next, the data refutes the theoretical predictions that 
subjects play unique equilibrium cut-offs. In fact, we find a high variance in the cut-offs of 
individual players. Also we find excess aggressiveness in the individual subjects’ decisions, 
which is consistent with previous experiments on global games and can be rationalised as-
suming that players have beliefs about others playing overly aggressive strategies. Most im-
portantly, we investigate the two different kinds of uncertainty regarding the signals in this 
game. We cannot confirm the comparative statics theoretical predictions of an opposite effect 
for risk and ambiguity. The experimental data shows no difference between risk and ambigu-
ity for the estimated cut-off values of individual player and also no difference for the aggre-
gate coordination behaviour. As this kind of coordination game continuously generates overly 
aggressive behaviour, one could further test whether global games also produce ambiguity 
affine behaviour with additional experiments.  
In chapter 5 we have studied a game of strategic information transmission and how players 
exploit and respond to incentives for deception, especially when these are disclosed. Without 
a conflict of interest there is no difference in subjects’ behaviour for different degrees of 
transparency. With a conflict of interest, increasing transparency has a significant effect on 
subjects’ behaviour. The advisors send deceptive messages with a high frequency and in-
crease their extent of lying the more the conflict of interest is made transparent. Nevertheless, 
advisors do not use maximally deceptive messages and thus overcommunicate. By contrast, 
advisees account for the conflict of interest by discounting the messages they receive. How-
ever, they do not discount the messages sufficiently, even given their own beliefs about the 
degree of deception from their counterparts. Explaining such behaviour, fairness concerns for 
the advisees might play a role.  
Chapter 6 was directed at fairness in behavioural economics. Based on an established theo-
retical model, we make a first step towards the investigation of multi-dimensional fairness. 
This is again a question difficult to address with empirical data. Therefore, we start this ques-
tion with a small extension of a social preferences model, introducing a conversion factor to 
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weigh off different dimensions of fairness, i.e. monetary pay-off and working effort. Then we 
devise a real effort experiment to obtain clear observations about the two dimensions of fair-
ness at hand. We confirm that people perceive both dimensions of fairness and involve them 
in their decision making. More importantly, we are able to demonstrate a self-serving bias 
effect where players distort the conversion factors to their own advantage. In this regard, there 
is a lot of experimental work remaining, testing the interplay and accessibility of additional 
fairness dimensions.  
Overall, this thesis has investigated how information is used in various economically relevant 
contexts, such as auctions, speculative attack games and strategic advice giving. It has also 
demonstrated how the notion of economic fairness can be expanded to accommodate addi-
tional dimensions such as working effort. 
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